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Climate change will likely have significant negative impacts on 
humans, animals, and the environment. The potential severity of these 
effects has generated a need for effective messages that communicate 
both the nature of climate change and actions that may be taken to 
prevent the worst impacts from occurring.  The studies presented in 
this dissertation examine how perceptual screens and message 
structures affect the interpretation and application of climate change 
messages.   
Three studies respectively examine how individuals respond to 
messages that vary by the social identity of potential victims, episodic 
vs. thematic descriptions of potential victims, and the presence or 
absence of statistics when discussing the impacts of climate change on 
potential victims. Data from study 1 reveals a significant interaction 
between experimental participants’ political party identification and 
the identity of climate change victims, with news stories discussing 
out-group victims generating a boomerang effect among Republicans. 
Study 2 finds that individual behavior change was not sensitive to 
episodic and thematic message manipulation, but thematic frames 
were more effective in building support for climate change policies by 
 increasing the attribution of responsibility to society at large.  The final 
study examines how numeracy may moderate how the presence or 
absence of statistics in a news story impacts public willingness to 
donate to organizations working on the issue of climate change.  The 
results from study 3 reveal that low-numerate individuals were 
sensitive to numeric framing effects and were willing to donate more 
when persuasive messages included statistics than when they did not, 
while high numerate individuals were not affected by presence or 
absence of numbers. 
This dissertation demonstrates the importance of taking 
perceptual screens and message structure into account when 
designing prosocial messages. Considerations for applying these 
research findings and avenues for future research building from these 
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In this dissertation, I examine how messages about climate 
change impact individual behavior change and policy preferences. I 
pay close attention to the influence of perceptual screens that cause 
people to interpret messages in different ways. The goal of the 
dissertation is to provide a greater understanding of how different 
choices in constructing messages can affect how messages are 
interpreted and applied. 
 The choice of climate change as a substantive domain of 
research places the dissertation within the realm of prosocial 
communication – communication that aims to have an individual 
engage in positive behavior for the betterment of themselves, society, 
or both. Scholars have investigated prosocial communication from 
multiple perspectives, including domains such as health (Meirick, 
2008) and poverty (Slovic, 2007) and through mediums such as 
television (W. J. Brown & Singhal, 1990) and experiential education 
(Hocking & Lawrence, 2000). 
I focus on the impact of climate change messages because 
climate change differs from most domains of prosocial message 
research in a critical way – it is impossible for someone, through 
individual behavior change, to make any distinguishable impact on 
the target of change (in this case, the global climate). A person may be 
able to reduce their personal carbon footprint, but they are unable to 
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point to any demarcated impact that their personal reduction has on 
the global climate. This contrasts with an issue such as poverty: if a 
person gives a food bar to a homeless man on the street, the charitable 
giver has not made a significant dent in the large issue of poverty, but 
is able to take comfort in the fact that he or she provided nutritious 
food for someone in need. 
This difference provides fertile ground to test findings from other 
domains of prosocial communication in which an individual can make 
a difference through individual action. Some communication 
techniques, such as the use of a vivid identified exemplar (Kogut & 
Ritov, 2005a, 2005b), are effective at eliciting donations for those in 
need. But what happens when someone cannot individually make a 
difference? As will be shown below, the portrayal of an identified victim 
becomes less effective than a more abstract, systemic description of 
the issue when a communicator wants to elicit policy support for an 
issue such as climate change. The nature of the issue creates a 
perceptual screen for how individuals apply the message information. I 
also investigate two complementary message components: 1) the 
identity of who is affected by climate change, and 2) the use of 
statistics or verbal descriptors to describe the impacts of climate 
change. These two message tests are chosen because previous 
literature suggests that they are likely to have significant impacts on 
how climate messages are interpreted, they address significant holes 
in the literature, and they are likely to moderate the impact of using 
an identified victim or more thematic information to describe the 
impact of an issue. Taken together, the three studies presented here 
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provide information on the impact that different types of prosocial 
messages may have on the public, and demonstrate the importance of 
taking message structures and perceptual screens into account when 
designing messages. 
 
Climate Change as a Communication Problem 
The current scientific consensus is that climate change is likely 
to have significant negative impacts on humans, wildlife, and the 
environment in the near future (Pachauri & Reisinger, 2007; Solomon 
et al., 2008) and that changes in government policy and individual 
actions may attenuate the worst changes from occurring. Scientists, 
environmental organizations, politicians, and a large coalition of 
interested parties have worked to identify how different 
communication techniques may affect the willingness of the public to 
address climate change through individual behavior change and 
support for climate mitigation policies. Nisbet and Mooney (2007), 
amongst others, have called for scientists to place a greater reliance on 
communication techniques that can improve how messages resonate 
with the public and provide a greater context for information 
embedded within science messages.  
One suggested method is the use of framing, which examines, in 
part, how presenting information in different ways can affect the 
impact of messages on attitudes and behavior. This introduction 
provides a context for the studies to follow by discussing the obstacles 
that climate change poses as a communication problem, a brief 
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overview of the climate change communication and relevant public 
opinion literature, and the literature concerning framing processes. 
 Before beginning a discussion of how best to communicate 
about climate change, it is necessary to situate the issue of climate 
change within the broader context of risk communication. Climate 
change is a useful substantive domain to test and develop 
communication theory, but also poses unique challenges for 
communicators that are often not faced with other risk issues.  While 
individuals can often directly respond to risks that they face (e.g. 
putting on a seatbelt when getting into a car or wearing sunscreen 
when going outside), an individual has few avenues to directly adjust 
the risk they face from climate change. This distinction provides useful 
opportunities to not only apply communication theories to the issue of 
climate change, but to also identify boundary conditions for theories 
developed in other substantive domains. In this section I will discuss 
some of the unique challenges that climate change poses and also 
discuss how communication theories may be applied to climate 
change. 
 Climate change fits within a general category of risk described 
by Hardin’s Tragedy of the Commons (Hardin, 1968, 1998), in which a 
group of people rely on a resource or emit a pollution that affects the 
common good or health of a community. Hardin uses the example of 
cattle herders who individually benefit from allowing their cattle to 
graze on a common field. While an individual herder benefits directly 
from having his or her cattle graze on the field, the costs of the grazing 
(e.g. reduced grass quality and volume) are distributed amongst all the 
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herders. Because herders receive the full benefit, but only a fraction of 
the cost, from having their cattle graze, a self-interested herder will 
find short-term profit by maximizing the amount of cattle put out to 
pasture. However, left to their own devices in a fully unregulated 
structure, the collective action of the herders will lead to overgrazing 
and an eventual collapse of the resource. Resource depletion can only 
be avoided if the herders devise a system of resource allocation that 
allows individual use of the common resource while preventing 
collective overuse.  
The issue of the commons occurs in multiple domains, including 
deforestation (Southgate, Sierra, & L. Brown, 1991), desertification 
(Picardi & Seifert, 1976), transboundary pollution (Kindt, 1986), and 
climate change (Engel & Saleska, 2005; Gardner, 2006; Ostrom, 
Burger, Field, Norgaard, & Policansky, 1999; Rachlinski, 2000). The 
utilization of common resources does not always lead to tragedy; for 
example, the Maine lobster industry has adopted successful 
regulations to maintain sustainable levels of fishing (Acheson, 2003). 
Mechanisms for generating agreements to protect the commons can 
arise through centralized government, private ownership, and non-
governmental community based institutions (Feeny, Berkes, McCay, & 
Acheson, 1990). Recent climate negotiations, such as those that 
resulted in the Kyoto protocol (O’Neill & Oppenheimer, 2002), point to 
international efforts to protect the common resource of a favorable 
global climate by managing global emissions of carbon dioxide and 
other greenhouse gas emissions; however, to date these efforts have 
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failed to generate the necessary commitments from the international 
community to mitigate the harmful impacts of climate change. 
In a review of how common resources can be effectively 
managed, Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern (2003) found that agreements are 
most successful if the following five conditions are met: 1) the resource 
and use of the resource can be effectively and inexpensively monitored, 
2) the rates of change in resource use are moderate, 3) affected parties 
have frequent communication and a high degree of social capital, 4) 
outsiders can inexpensively be excluded from using the resource, and 
5) resource users support monitoring of resource use. While most 
common resource issues are not favorable across all of these 
conditions, climate change is generally unfavorable across all of them, 
making it a particularly difficult commons problem to solve.  
In addition to these difficulties, climate change holds a number 
of additional characteristics that make it a particularly troublesome 
issue within the domain of common resources. Moser (2010) outlines 
some of the challenges associated with communicating about climate 
change as: 
• Lack of visibility: Greenhouses gasses are largely invisible, 
which makes it difficult to visually depict their presence. 
• Great physical distance between cause and effects of 
climate change: The impacts of climate change will be 
likely to occur in areas that are geographically distant 
from the largest emitters of greenhouse gases. 
• Great temporal distance between cause and effects of 
climate change: The impacts of emissions today are likely 
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to be felt in the future, forcing a delayed impact of 
emissions and delayed gratification for mitigation efforts. 
• Creeping warning signals: The warning signs of climate 
change generally arise as gradual shifts in the 
characteristics of natural events such as changes in sea 
level, severity of storms, and incidences of forest fires. The 
changes are unlikely to change dramatically from year to 
year, which would likely serve as a greater catalyst for 
public demands of climate mitigation efforts. 
• Complexity and uncertainty of the issue: While scientific 
research has generally demonstrated that climate change 
is occurring and is likely to intensify in the years ahead 
without mitigating action, it remains a very complex 
phenomena. This makes it difficult to pinpoint what 
events may be due to natural variation or serve as an 
indicator of broader climate change. 
 The final difficulty faced with regulating climate emissions is 
that current global economic development rests largely on increasing 
carbon based energy production, such as burning coal (Heil & Selden, 
2001). Successful long-term efforts to mitigate climate change will 
require the participation of developing countries as well as 
industrialized countries, but both developing countries and major 
industrial polluters have been hesitant to commit to greenhouse gas 
reductions either in the short or long-term (Watson, 2003). The 
arguments from industrialized countries that remain uncommitted 
have primarily been that a commitment would be damaging to the 
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economy and put industrialized economies at a competitive 
disadvantage to developing countries (Watson, 2003). Developing 
countries, in turn, have advocated for development needs in order to 
serve their impoverished populations. For example, a representative of 
the Indian delegation to the 2009 United Nations climate conference in 
Bonn, Germany, stated “If the question is whether India will take on 
binding emission reduction commitments, the answer is no. It is 
morally wrong for us to agree to reduce when 40 percent of Indians do 
not have access to electricity. Of course, everybody wants to go solar, 
but costs are very, very high” (Lakshmi, 2009). Scientists familiar with 
the challenges facing long-term climate change negotiations suggest 
that the best chance for success may rests on technological 
developments in the areas of solar and thermal technology 
(Hasselmann et al., 2003) in addition to nuclear fission and fusion 
(Sailor, Bodansky, Braun, Fetter, & van der Zwaan, 2000). 
Communication strategies may be utilized to promote government 
policies that will encourage the research and development of new 
technologies while aiding in the shift away from traditional fossil fuel 
sources for power. 
In short, climate change negotiations must cross significant 
hurdles if they are to eventually be successful. While negotiations 
occur, there is still room for communities and countries to take an 
active approach to individually help mitigate the problem and also 
demonstrate solutions that may be effective on a global scale. Within 
this domain, communication can play an important role to shift the 
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attitudes and behaviors of individuals and public support for climate 
mitigation policies. 
In recent year, scholars have increasingly applied 
communication theories to address how best to communicate with the 
public about climate change (Maibach, Roser-Renouf, & Leiserowitz, 
2008; Moser & Dilling, 2007; Moser, 2010; Nisbet, 2009; Nisbet & 
Kotcher, 2009). While there is some debate in the literature on 
whether or not scientists should be public advocates on the issue of 
climate change (Fischhoff, 2007; Maibach & Priest, 2009), there is 
broad agreement that public advocacy will likely play a critical role in 
encouraging societal changes that may reduce carbon emissions.  
Initiatives to reduce carbon emissions may occur primarily 
through voluntary individual behavior change, often encouraged 
through communication campaigns, or through government 
regulations. While both of these approaches have the potential to 
mitigate climate change, they both face distinct challenges in 
implementation. Looking at individual behavior changes, individuals 
face the structural constraint that most cities have been built around 
transportation and approaches to energy use that consume large 
amounts of fossil fuels – this substantially hinders the adoption of 
voluntary action to reduce an individual’s carbon footprint (Ockwell, 
Whitmarsh, & O'Neill, 2009). Furthermore, even without structural 
constraints, if an individual sees no direct personal gain from taking 
action, such as a lower electric bill from more efficient lighting, then 
any motivation to change behavior requires the belief that enough 
other individuals will also change their carbon emission-related 
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behavior to create a substantial collective impact to mitigate the effects 
of climate change. However, individuals tend to believe that others are 
less willing to cooperate than they are (Kogut & Beyth-Marom, 2008) 
and are often unwilling to take action to address an issue when they 
believe that others will not take corresponding action to a sufficient 
degree to make a significant impact on the problem.  
One solution to overcoming inhibitions to individual behavior 
change is to institute government policies that forces individuals to 
reduce their carbon emissions through financial incentives and 
regulation. Climate mitigation policies, however, have found limited 
traction in the political sphere because they often carry short term 
costs, such as higher taxes on gasoline, to address the long-term goal 
of attenuating the negative impacts of climate change. This is often 
unpalatable to politicians caught in a short term political cycle and 
fearing a potential public backlash (Ockwell et al., 2009). 
One possible solution to the difficulties in implementing 
government policies on climate change is to use public advocacy 
campaigns to build a public desire for the government policies to be 
implemented (Maibach et al., 2008; Ockwell et al., 2009). From this 
perspective, communication strategies on climate change will be most 
effective if they focus squarely on changing public opinion about the 
role that the government should play in addressing climate change. 
The inclusion of research concerning framing processes provides an 
approach that can be utilized to identify how messages concerning 




The framing research paradigm examines both the process of 
constructing messages and the subsequent impact that the messages 
can have in the public sphere. The domain of what can be considered 
a frame is broad, and depending on which research discipline is used 
for inquiry the operationalization of the term and scope of subsequent 
investigation can vary greatly. The following section will present an 
overview of research concerning framing processes and how it informs 
the studies presented in this dissertation.  
The term “framing” draws from multiple theoretical approaches, 
including attribution theory (Kelley & Michela, 1980), expectancy value 
models (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1973, 2000), and Goffman’s work on 
interpretive schemas (Goffman, 1974). In the field of sociology, frames 
have primarily been defined as “schemata of interpretation” that allow 
individuals “to locate, perceive, identify, and label” issues and topics 
within their own personal context (Goffman, 1974, p. 21). Gamson and 
Modigliani (1989) describe frames as interpretative packages that give 
meaning to an issue by presenting “a central organizing idea…for 
making sense of relevant events, suggesting what is an issue” (p. 3). 
Reese (2001) states that “frames are organizing principles that are 
socially shared and persistent over time, that work symbolically to 
meaningfully structure the social world” (p. 11). Reese (2007) argues 
further that the term “frame” should not be merely interchangeable 
with using the term “topic” or “theme,” stating: “if they [researchers] 
cannot show how the frame does more ‘organizing’ and ‘structuring’ 
work, I prefer they not use the label” (p. 151). Popkin (1993) notes that 
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frames are used “whenever there is more than one way to think about 
a subject” (p. 83).  Entman (1993) states that “to frame is to select 
some aspect of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a 
communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem 
definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment 
recommendation for the item described” (p. 52).  
The framing process can thus be seen as the work of creating 
meaning and constructing reality (Benford & Snow, 2000). When 
examining the relation between framing and social movements 
concerning climate change, a useful approach is to use the lens of 
collective action frames, which Gamson (1992) defines as “not merely 
aggregations of individual attitudes and perceptions but also the 
outcome of negotiated shared meaning” (p. 111). Under this paradigm, 
the core functions of a frame are to identify and define: 1) a problem, 
2) who is to blame for the problem, 3) an alternative to the current 
situation that will solve the problem, 4) what action can be taken to 
promote the alternative, and 5) provide motivation to take action. As 
this terrain is navigated by interested actors, a key determining factor 
in the influence of a frame is how well it resonates with targets of 
mobilization.  
The question of resonance looks at the role that different 
message factors play in an individual’s decision making process to 
form attitudes and behavioral responses events and objects in the 
world around them. The expectancy value model (Fishbein & Ajzen, 
1980) explains how attitudes on different object attributes may be 
used to construct opinions and decision making about the object. 
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Under this model, an attribute attitude is represented by the 
mathematical formula Attitudei = ∑vi*wi with vi defined as an evaluation 
of a specific attribute (i.e. the positive or negative evaluation of 
attributei) and wi defined as the salience, or weight, given to the 
attribute (i.e. the weight assigned to the evaluation of attributei).  
 In a simplified model using climate change, an individual may 
evaluate climate mitigation policies on multiple attributes, such as the 
impact the policy will have on the economy, national security, energy 
independence, the environment, etc. For a proposal such as instituting 
a gas tax, an individual may believe that the tax would impact the 
economy negatively, improve national security by making the nation 
more independent, and may or may not affect the environment with an 
uncertain mitigation of climate change. With these conflicting 
evaluations of different attributes of a gas tax, the aggregate level of 
support, such as whether or not an individual would choose to vote for 
the proposal, will be guided by how salient, or how much weight, the 
individual assigns to each object attribute. This approach to framing 
informs experimental framing approaches that investigate subsets of 
the larger framing process, such as the emphasis framing effect 
(Druckman, 2001). 
From a social psychology perspective, however, the term framing 
is often not connected to the “structuring work” that Reese (2007) 
focuses on, or even the emphasis framing effect from Druckman’s 
(2001) work, but rather refers to how small changes in the structure of 
messages that convey logically equivalent information can significantly 
alter how individuals interpret the information. While the emphasis 
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framing effect examines how different non-fungible attributes may 
affect attitudes and behaviors related to an object or issue, equivalency 
framing effects examine the impacts of different fungible descriptions 
(Kühberger & Tanner, 2009; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). One of the 
most well-known examples of an equivalency framing effect is Tversky 
and Kahneman’s Asian disease problem (Tversky & Kahneman) in 
which participants are asked to choose between different programs to 
combat a disease outbreak that has the potential to kill 600 people. 
The potential for saving lives is either described with a positive valence 
(focusing on the number of lives saved) or a negative valence (focusing 
the lives lost). In the positive valence condition, the choices are 
described as: 
 
If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. 
If Program B is adopted, there is a 1/3 probability that 600 
people will be saved and a 2/3 probability that no people will be 
saved. 
 
In the negative valence condition the choices are described as: 
 
If Program C is adopted, 400 people will die. 
If Program D is adopted, there is a 1/3 probability that nobody 
will die, and a 2/3 probability that everybody will die. 
 
In this approach to framing, participants are typically assigned 
to either the positive or negative valence conditions, and then asked to 
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choose between one of the two programs. All programs have the same 
outcome expectancy, although program A and C guarantee that a 
certain number will live and die, while programs B and D provide a 
probability that either everyone will live or everyone will die. With this 
specific problem, Tversky and Kahneman (1981) found that individuals 
tended to prefer the sure option in the positive valence condition (200 
people will be saved) but prefer the risky option in the negative valence 
condition (1/3 probability nobody will die and 2/3 probability 
everybody will die). This result is explained in terms of prospect theory 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) and the biases that individuals have in 
decision making depending on their reference point and the valence of 
the description of the issues. It is worth noting that scholars have 
recently tested different versions of the Asian disease problem and now 
suggest that fuzzy-trace theory (Reyna & Brainerd, 1991, 1995) may 
offer a better explanation for the findings than prospect theory (for a 
full review, see Kühberger & Tanner, 2009). Additional logically 
equivalent frames have also been examined for various formats, such 
as gain/loss frames (De Martino, Kumaran, Seymour, & Dolan, 2006; 
O'Keefe & Jensen, 2007) and the impact of different numeric 
presentations (e.g. 10 out of 100 vs. 10% out of 100; Peters et al., 
2006). 
In summary, the term “framing” may refer to broad sociological 
processes of media message construction and subsequent shaping of 
social reality for the general public, or it may refer to more basic 
psychological processes that guide how individuals may interpret 
messages with slightly different structures. While some scholars have 
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attempted to “clean up” the field by proposing clearer boundary 
conditions of what framing refers to (e.g. Scheufele, 2000), there are 
still a very limited number of citations that cross disciplinary 
boundaries, and in the field of communication the term remains fairly 
amorphous (e.g. see the different approaches adopted by Chong & 
Druckman, 2007; Edy & Meirick, 2007; Entman, 2007; Hyunseo 
Hwang, Gotlieb, Seungahn Nah, & McLeod, 2007; Kinder, 2007; Reese, 
2007; Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007; Sheafer, 2007; Van Gorp, 2007; 
Weaver, 2007; Yuqiong Zhou & Moy, 2007).  
In this dissertation, I acknowledge the broad approach to 
framing offered by sociology scholars such as Benford and Snow 
(2000), but focus on the motivational functions of frames which draws 
on the social psychology literature. In other words, in this dissertation 
I focus on a small subset of the framing process, namely how changes 
in message structures can affect frame resonance with members of 
different publics, but do so with the understanding that the impacts of 
changes in these structures operate within the broader process of 
negotiated meaning that occurs across the framing process. In the 
following section, I will describe how framing scholars have generally 
approached the issue of climate change, and then discuss the research 
gap that that the three studies presented in this dissertation attempt 
to address. 
 
Framing of Climate Change 
To date, the majority of framing research examining climate 
change has focused on the construction of different climate change 
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frames. For example, Boykoff and Boykoff (2004) focused on how the 
norm of providing balanced representation of conflicting sides led to a 
biased representation of the science of climate change, and 
subsequently linked this bias to the need for the dramatization of 
climate coverage (Boykoff & Boykoff, 2007). Trumbo (1996) looked at 
climate change in terms of Downs’ issue-attention cycle (Downs, 
1972), and found that scientists are generally associated with 
discourse on the cause and effects of climate change, while politicians 
and interest groups are associated with discourse on how best to 
address climate change. Boykoff and Roberts (2007) examined how the 
media may influence public opinion, government policies and practices 
towards climate change. Weingart, Engels, and Pansegrau (2000) 
examined the dynamics of climate change discourse in the spheres of 
science, politics, and the mass media. Additional work has examined 
how competitive framing by liberals and conservatives has affected 
climate change policy, with conservative discourse contributing to the 
effective obstruction or delay of the adoption of government policies to 
address climate change (Dunlap & McCright, 2008; Dunlap, Xiao, & 
McCright, 2001; McCright & Dunlap, 2000, 2003).  
Nisbet (2009) provides a framework for thinking about what 
thematic elements have been adopted in the framing of climate 
change, parsing the themes into categories such as “pandora’s box,” 
“scientific and technical uncertainty,” “economic development and 
competitiveness,” “morality and ethics,” and “social progress.”  
In a “Pandora’s Box” frame, left-leaning politicians, such as 
former Vice-President Al Gore, and leading scientists have used an 
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averting disaster frame by discussing global climate change in the 
following terms: a) the current scientific consensus that it is a human 
caused phenomenon; b) the potential damage to communities 
throughout the world may be catastrophic; and c) with urgent action it 
may be possible to attenuate the impact (e.g. Guggenheim, 2006). In 
addition, some policymakers and advocacy groups have recently begun 
to use a Pandora’s Box/national security frame that packages policies 
aimed at combating global climate change as a national security issue 
in terms of reducing the strategic dependence on foreign oil and the 
need for involvement in the Middle East (e.g. CNA, 2007).  
In contrast, conservative leaders have focused on highlighting 
and amplifying the scientific uncertainty concerning aspects of both 
the causes and effects of global climate change (a scientific uncertainty 
frame), and framed the issue in terms of the negative economic 
impacts (an economic frame) caused by taking action to combat it 
(McCright & Dunlap, 2000). While stressing the scientific uncertainty 
of global climate change, conservative leaders have typically taken the 
approach that the impacts of global climate change are inevitable, 
adopting measures such as greenhouse gas emission caps will ruin the 
economies of industrialized nations, and global leaders should focus 
on ways to adapt to the impacts of global climate change instead of 
actions to attenuate global climate change itself (McCright & Dunlap, 
2003) 
Beyond this partisan divide, some Christian religious leaders 
have adopted a moral frame to address global climate change (Bingam, 
2007) with campaigns such as “what would Jesus drive?” This has 
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sparked counter framing by some conservative Christian groups such 
as the Interfaith Stewardship Alliance (2006) that stresses scientific 
uncertainty about human-caused climate change and that global 
climate change should not distract Christians from other “moral” 
issues such as abortion. A third moral, but more secular, frame has 
packaged global climate change in terms of the ethical question of 
contemporary society leaving a “debt” that future generations will have 
pay later (e.g. International Humanist and Ethical Union, 2007).  
In a separate frame, community and business leaders have 
adopted a social progress frame, which goes beyond the strictly 
monetary orientation of the economic frame to include issues such as 
social justice, ecosystem integrity, and general improvements in the 
quality of life (e.g. Agyeman, Doppelt, Lynn, & Hatic, 2007). Others, 
such as some environmental advocacy groups, have also used a social 
progress frame that proposes a radical restructuring of society that de-
emphasizes the role of consumption in general and promotes 
fundamental cultural change, rather than simply limiting consumption 
of products that contribute to global climate change (e.g. Swedish, n.d.). 
While multiple scholars have examined how thematic differences 
in the presentation of climate information (e.g. a national security 
frame vs. an environmental frame) may impact public perceptions, 
there has been a dearth of studies examining how message structure 
(e.g. using statistics or verbal descriptors to describe the impact of 
climate change) may also affect the impact of the message. This is a 
critical area that complements the work in thematic presentation, but 
also provides an opportunity to examine how climate change may 
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provide a unique domain of inquiry with characteristics that will affect 
how theories concerning message structure will operate. Some 
researchers have examined the impacts of subtle changes in message 
structures concerning climate change, such as Whitmarsh's (2009) 
findings that the term “global warming” generates more concern in the 
general public than using the term “climate change,” but in general 
scholars have paid a limited amount of attention to this domain of 
research. In this dissertation, I attempt to help address this research 
gap by focusing on how message structures can impact the public’s 
willingness to address climate change.  
 
Overview of Presented Studies 
The studies presented in this dissertation examine how 
changing the structure of a message may affect its impact. They 
investigate three key message manipulations that have not been 
previously examined in the context of climate change: the social 
identity of potential victims, episodic vs. thematic descriptions of 
potential victims, and the presence or absence of statistics when 
discussing the impacts of climate change on potential victims. These, 
respectively, look at the questions of who is affected, how many are 
affected, and the format the information is provided in. The 
manipulations are investigated separately to allow for easier 
interpretation of the results, but also set the stage for interactions 
across the manipulations, as all of the manipulations are likely to 
come into play when a science communicator is deciding how to 
construct messages regarding climate change. 
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In Chapter 2, the first study draws from social identity theory 
(Tajfel, 1974; Tajfel & Turner, 2004) to examine how the identity of 
potential victims of climate change may affect the willingness of the 
public to address the issue. The data showed a significant interaction 
between experimental participants’ political party identification and 
the identity of climate change victims, with news stories discussing 
out-group victims generating a boomerang effect among Republicans.  
In Chapter 3, the second study looks at how the adoption of 
episodic or thematic frames (Iyengar, 1990, 1994) may affect 
individual behavior change and policy preferences related to climate 
change. Individual behavior change was not sensitive to episodic and 
thematic message manipulation, but thematic frames were more 
effective in building support for climate change policies by increasing 
the attribution of responsibility to society at large.  
In Chapter 4, the final study examines how numeracy (Peters et 
al., 2006) may moderate how the presence or absence of statistics in a 
news story impacts public willingness to donate to organizations 
working on the issue of climate change. The results showed that low-
numerate individuals were sensitive to numeric framing effects and 
were willing to donate more when persuasive messages included 
statistics than when they did not, while high numerate individuals 
were not affected by presence or absence of numbers. Table 1 provides 
a summary of the studies and their respective independent and 
dependent variables. 
The studies presented here demonstrate the impact that 
perceptual screens and structural changes in messages can have on  
22 
 
predispositions for behavior, and the results set the stage for future 
interactions between numeracy, the identified victim effect, and the 
use of statistics. The results are discussed with respect to future 
research directions, and how science communicators may nudge 
(Thaler & Sunstein, 2003) individuals towards or away from action on 
issues such as climate change.
Table 1 
Summary of Dissertation Studies 
Study Independent Variables Dependent Variables 
Study 1 In-group vs. Out-group Victims Policy Preferences 
Political Party Identification 









POLITICAL PARTISANSHIP, SOCIAL IDENTITY, AND PUBLIC 
SUPPORT FOR CLIMATE MITIGATION 
 
Climate change in America, in addition to being an 
environmental issue, is a political issue. Despite widespread scientific 
consensus that global climate change is largely caused by 
anthropogenic sources and has the potential to create substantial 
ecological, social, and economic harm, the American public remains 
largely divided on whether, and how, to approach climate change. The 
divide in America largely falls across political and ideological lines; 
most Democrats believe that climate change is caused by humans and 
support government policy to address climate change while most 
Republicans do not.  
The divide between Republicans and Democrats has widened 
significantly over the past 10 years on measures such as the belief 
that climate change is caused by humans, climate change will pose a 
serious threat in the respondent’s lifetime, and that the effects of 
climate change have already begun (Dunlap & McCright, 2008). 
During this time, climate change beliefs increasingly became a marker 
for political identity, making individuals likely to pay more attention to 
and interpret information in ways that reinforce their political beliefs 
and social identity. In this polarized environment, media stories on 
climate change may serve to amplify partisan differences on the issue 
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depending on what elements of climate change are highlighted in the 
story.  
One important dynamic in media stories is the question of who 
is affected by climate change. News stories may focus on impacts in 
the United States, in distant areas, or a combination of the two. To the 
best of my knowledge, previous research has not investigated how the 
identity of climate change victims in news stories may interact with 
audience partisan identification in the formation of public opinion 
around climate change. 
The research presented in this chapter examines the role that 
embedded social identity cues in climate change messages may play in 
amplifying partisan polarization on the issue of climate change. This 
chapter will first discuss political polarization on the issue of climate 
change and the role that framing, social identity, and political party 
affiliation may play in the effectiveness of climate change messages. 
Following this discussion, the current study will be presented, which 
examines the differential impacts of messages that describe the impact 
of climate change on in-group, located in the same geographic area as 
the experimental participant, or out-group victims, located far away. 
The results demonstrate that the group identity of climate change 
victims interacts with political orientation by reducing Republican 
support for climate change action when the impacts of climate change 
on perceived out-groups are highlighted, while Democratic support is 






Ideological Polarization on Climate Change 
 As scientists have become increasingly certain about the 
human causes of climate change and the urgent need to address it, 
one might expect that public opinion about climate change would 
follow a similar pattern in beliefs about human causation, perceptions 
of the threat of climate change, and support for government policies 
that address the issue. However, polling data shows modest changes 
across these measures for the public as a whole and an increasing 
polarization between Democrats and Republicans (Dunlap, 2008). 
 For example, in Gallup polling general public agreement with the 
question of whether “temperature changes over the last century are 
due more to human activities than natural changes in the 
environment,” has moved from 61% in 2003 to 58% in 2008 (Dunlap, 
2008). While the overall public opinion has barely moved during this 
five-year time period, agreement with this question amongst 
Democrats rose from 68% in 2003 to 73% in 2008, while Republican 
agreement declined from 52% in 2003 to 42% in 2008 (Dunlap). 
Similar examples of political polarization over the last 10 years have 
occurred for beliefs on whether the effects of global warming have 
already begun, the scientific consensus on global warming, the threat 
that global warming will pose in the respondent’s lifetimes, and 
whether effects of climate change are exaggerated in the news (Dunlap 
& McCright, 2008). 
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 Why has the public become more polarized on the issue of 
climate change during the time period that scientists have reached a 
stronger consensus on the issue? Layman, Carsey, and Horowitz 
(2006) suggest that recent years have been unique in the breadth of 
policy divisions between parties. While parties have historically been 
divided across a single policy dimension, through a process Layman et 
al. term “conflict extension” political parties today are largely divided 
on all major policy initiatives. Thus, increasing levels of political 
polarization on the issue of climate change may be seen as part of a 
larger trend of party separation across a broad range of issues. Dunlap 
and McCright (2008) note that there was not a strong partisan divide 
on environmental issues until the Reagan administration of the 1980s, 
under which environmental regulations were labeled as constraints on 
economic growth by the Republican administration. Since the Reagan 
administration, Democratic politicians have generally been more 
supportive of environmental policies than Republican politicians.  
 On the issue of climate change, throughout the 1990s 
conservatives argued that climate change would largely be beneficial, 
that attempts to mitigate climate change would lead to economic 
catastrophe, and that there was insufficient evidence that climate 
change was occurring (Dunlap et al., 2001; McCright & Dunlap, 2000). 
Frank Luntz, a conservative political consultant, played an influential 
role during this time period by strongly encouraging Republicans to 
stress that there was a great deal of scientific uncertainty about 
climate change, and that taking any action without the participation of 
developing countries would lead to economic catastrophe (Nisbet, 
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2009). Liberals, on the other hand, generally warned of the dire 
consequences that would affect humans and the environment if no 
action was taken. While many Democrats called for immediate action, 
the communication strategy of the conservative movement has largely 
been successful in blocking climate mitigation policies (McCright & 
Dunlap, 2003).  
 While policy positions for a political party arise through an 
interactive process between party leaders, political activists, and 
members of the general public who identify with political parties, 
scholars (Dunlap & McCright, 2008; Fiorina & Abrams, 2008; Layman 
et al., 2006) suggest that the adoption of policy positions is driven 
primarily through a top down process led by political elites within a 
party.  From this viewpoint, the public ideological polarization on 
climate change can be seen as a phenomenon that is rooted in 
differences between the ideological differences of Democratic and 
Republic political elites. 
 As noted above, multiple analyses have examined the ideological 
divide on climate change by comparing differences in climate change 
narratives adopted by Democrats and Republicans (McCright & 
Dunlap, 2000; Nisbet, 2009) to demonstrate linkages between elite 
political discourse and constituent polarization on the issue. However, 
to the best of my knowledge researchers have not experimentally 
tested the potential for subtle differences in informational stories on 
climate change, such as the identity of potential climate change 
victims, to amplify polarization on the issue of climate change amongst 
the public. Small differences in message structure may significantly 
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affect how climate messages resonate with the public. Benford and 
Snow (2000) suggest that this may occur depending on how the 
messages resonate with individual predispositions. The role that social 
identity plays in the framing process will be discussed in the following 
sections.  
 
Social Identity and Science Message Frames 
 As stated in the introduction, framing processes include the 
dynamics of how message themes and structures can alter the 
perceived applicability, belief importance, and salience of an issue 
construct when individuals are evaluating an issue (Chong & 
Druckman, 2007). Recent calls for science communicators to pay more 
attention to how they frame climate change to the general public 
(Nisbet, 2009; Nisbet & Mooney, 2007) have been paired with research 
examining how science communicators can strategically communicate 
the issue to a variety of audiences (e.g. Moser & Dilling, 2007). Ockwell 
et al. (2009) argue that appeals to individual behavior change will have 
limited impacts due to the free-rider problem. Instead, climate change 
appeals can be most effective if they drive public opinion to support 
climate change legislation. 
Public support for climate change policy is not only driven by 
advocacy campaigns, but can also be affected by general news stories 
on the issue (Corbett & Durfee, 2004; Ungar, 1992). It is important 
that communication scholars investigate how general climate change 
messages may impact public perceptions of climate change, including 
possible interactions between the content of the message and 
29 
characteristics of the receiver such as their political party affiliation. 
The research presented here takes this approach, and looks at how 
embedded social identity cues in media stories about climate change 
may amplify partisan differences on support for climate mitigation 
policies. 
One message factor in framing climate change is who is affected 
and how message receivers identify with the affected individuals and 
communities.  This perception is influenced by the message receiver’s 
social identity. An individual’s social identity is based on self-
categorization within a group of people that promotes a feeling of 
uniqueness between the in-group and others (Haslam, Oakes, 
Reynolds, & Turner, 1999; Haslam, Powell, & Turner, 2001). Group 
membership consists of the psychological belief, rather than the actual 
occurrence, that one does or does not belong to a specific population of 
people. Group identity is often flexible; different social categories of 
group membership, such as race, gender, religion, location, and 
political party, are interchangeable and can be manipulated by varying 
the emphasis on, and thus the salience of, different traits (Tajfel, 1982; 
Tajfel & Turner, 2004). 
Newspapers stories often focus on different population groups 
that will be affected by climate change, such as communities in the 
Mekong delta (Mydans, 2009), the Himalayas (Chhibber & Schild, 
2009) and the United States (Broder, 2009). While these news stories 
are often intended to be informational rather than persuasive, they 
present different frames by focusing on victims that audiences may 
perceive as being part of an in-group or an out-group.  
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Group membership can play a powerful moderating role in 
whether, and why, individuals are willing to help those in need 
(Stürmer, Snyder, Kropp, & Siem, 2006; Stürmer, Snyder, & Omoto, 
2005). A sense of community concern and protection of the group can 
play powerful roles in an individual’s willingness to make sacrifices to 
help an in-group more than an out-group (Omoto & Snyder, 1995). If 
stories about the impact of climate change discuss the location of 
victims of climate change, social identity theory suggests that 
individuals will tend to identify more with victims who are located in 
the same area as they are than those who are not. Thus, it is expected 
that individuals will be more willing to support government policies to 
address climate change when the effects are described as impacting 
individuals in a local community compared to distant communities.  
However, a message discussing climate change by focusing on 
distant victims may result in the message receiver being less 
supportive of legislation to address climate change. If the message was 
part of an advocacy campaign, this effect would be termed a 
boomerang effect. The boomerang effect occurs when a message is 
strategically constructed with a specific intent but produces a result 
that is the opposite of that intent (for a review see Byrne & Hart, 
2009). For example, anti-smoking messages can increase 
predispositions to smoke (Wolburg, 2004), anti-litter messages can 
increase predispositions to litter (Reich & Robertson, 2006), and 
appeals for donations to impoverished children can lower donation 
rates (Small, Loewenstien, & Slovic, 2007). The boomerang effect can 
be specific to certain segments of the population. For example, Schultz 
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et al. (2007) found that appeals to increase energy efficiency created a 
boomerang effect amongst households that were already very energy 
efficient and increased average energy use for this population segment. 
The boomerang effect occurs through two pathways: 1) receivers 
process the message as intended but do not properly comply, or 2) 
unintended constructs are activated in the receiver and drive the 
resulting attitude and behavioral change. The integrated theoretical 
framework proposed by Byrne and Hart (2009) states that when an 
individual receives a message, he or she will engage in competitive 
processing of different components of the message with certain aspects 
of the message becoming more salient than others.  
Research on motivated cognition suggests that rather than 
interpreting the facts of the message in an unbiased way, individuals 
will tend to interpret messages in ways that reinforce previously 
formed opinions on the issue (Chong & Druckman, 2007). Though 
scholars often point to self-selection for exposure to partisan 
information sources (Bennett & Iyengar, 2008) as a reason for issue 
polarization, messages may also be interpreted in ways that reinforce, 
or amplify, polarization. Cultural cognition researchers find that 
people tend to interpret information in ways that reinforce their 
cultural orientation (Kahan, 2010), and Mutz (2008) asserts exposure 
to any information content, regardless of the source, about 
contentious issues such as climate change is likely to activate political 
predispositions and increase issue polarization due to motivated 
cognition. This motivated cognition process can heavily influence the 
competitive processing of message components to make unintended 
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constructs more salient (Byrne & Hart, 2009). With some climate 
change messages promoting action on climate change, science 
communicators may be unintentionally presenting their message in 
ways that activate unintended constructs in the receiver. In this case, 
a climate change message discussing the impact that climate change 
is having on individuals in a distant area may activate the unintended 
construct that climate change will only impact those who are far away 
and reduce support for action to address climate change. 
The effects of group identity do not operate alone, but interact 
with the values and predispositions that an individual has in the 
process of opinion formation. As mentioned above, climate change has 
become a marker of political identity: Democrats generally believe that 
humans are primarily responsible for climate change and need to 
mitigate the effects with legislative action while Republicans generally 
do not (Krosnick, Holbrook, & Visser, 2000). It is likely that Democrats 
and Republicans will interpret climate change messages in ways that 
reinforce beliefs consistent with their political identity through 
motivated cognition. Based on this literature, I predicted that if a 
climate change message includes information describing the impacts 
of climate change on an out-group, Republicans will interpret the 
message in a way that reduces the need to take action on climate 
change while Democrats are likely to be resistant to the out-group 
component of the message. However, when messages describe the 
impacts that climate change will have on an in-group, it is likely that 
Democrats will find an increased need to take action while 
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Republicans will be resistant to the in-group aspect of the message. 
Formally stated, this leads to the following hypotheses: 
 
H1: Support for climate mitigation policies will vary by degree of 
audience identification with groups featured in a climate change 
message. 
 
H2: Political partisanship will moderate the influence of 






As with all of the experiments in this dissertation, participants 
were recruited from shopping malls in upstate New York with a sign 
that stated they would receive $5 in compensation for completing an 
experimental study. Every participant signed an IRB approved consent 
form before being directed to a private location to complete the study. 
All participants in a stimulus condition first read a story about the 
effects of climate change (the story differed by study and condition) 
and then filled out a questionnaire (the questionnaire also differed by 
study and condition). Participants in the control condition only filled 
out the questionnaire. In all of the studies, no participant took longer 





Participants in Study 1 were non-student adults (N=240; mean 
age = 38.42 years; age range = 18 - 80 years; 54% female). 
 
Experimental Design and Stimulus  
In the two stimulus conditions, participants read a simulated 
news story about climate change, while participants were not exposed 
to a news story in the control condition. The simulated new story was 
designed to be "non-political" as it did not contain any explicit political 
partisan cues and focused on the potential health impacts of climate 
change, an increasingly salient and important aspect of climate 
change (Frumkin, Hess, Luber, Malilay, & McGeehin, 2008). The story 
discussed the potential for climate change to increase the likelihood 
that individuals who spend a lot of time working outdoors, such as 
farmers, will be infected by diseases such as West Nile virus. The news 
story was generated explicitly for the experiment, but was based on 
facts reported in Associated Press stories. The story included pictures 
and names of ten farmers who were potentially at risk.  
Social identification with the potential victims featured in the 
story was varied by manipulating whether the story exemplars were 
located in the region where the experimental participants resided or 
were from a different region (by changing the headline, body text, and 
exemplar names). However, the exemplar photos in each story were 
not varied to guard against confounding effects from different facial 
expressions or other individual cues. The high social identification (in-
35 
group) condition used Upstate NY (the area where the participants 
were recruited from) as the location for the farmers while the low social 
identification (out-group) condition used either the state of Georgia or 
the country France. Multiple out-group samples were used to help 
ensure the manipulation was driving in-group and out-group 
identification rather than unintended group characteristics. The 
experimental stimuli used for the conditions are reproduced in 
Appendix A and Appendix B. 
As a manipulation check, after reading the news story, subjects 
were asked questions about how much they identified with exemplars 
in the story as an indicator of how much they identified with the 
groups featured in each story. Participants were asked how much they 
agree with the following statements: 1) “The people in the story have 
problems like my own;” 2) “I identify with the people featured in the 
story;” 3) “The people featured in the story are like me;” and 4) “I feel 
connected to the people featured in the story.” The questions were 
measured on a seven point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 7 (strongly disagree) and aggregated into a single 
identification scale (range 4-28, M=12.5, SD=6.5) which had a 
Cronbach’s alpha of 0.92. Participants identified with the exemplars 
employed in the in-group condition (M=13.8) significantly more than 
the exemplars in the out-group condition (M=11.3) t(154) = 2.45, p < 






OLS regression analysis was employed to test the hypotheses 
regarding the effect of social identification cues on support for climate 
mitigation, as well as the moderating influence of political 
identification. Political orientations, environmental values and beliefs, 
and experimental conditions were used as independent variables in 
the analysis. Support for government action on climate change was 
used as the dependent variable.  
 
Control Variables. Political partisanship was measured by 
asking subjects “when it comes to political parties in the United 
States, how would you best describe yourself?” The question was 
measured on a seven point scale that ranged from “a strong Democrat” 
(0) to “a strong Republican” (6) (M=2.6, SD=1.9). Role of government 
was assessed by asking respondents which of two statements came 
closest to their opinion, with respondents selecting “the less 
government, the better” coded as “1” and respondents who selected 
“there are more things that government should be doing” coded as “0” 
(30.3%). Belief in human-induced global warming was assessed with a 
dichotomous variable indicating whether subjects agreed with the 
statement “global climate change is occurring and we humans are the 
primary cause” (65%). Environmental values were determined by using 
a shortened 6-item version of the New Environmental Paradigm (NEP) 
scale (Dunlap, 2008). Respondents were asked how much they agreed 
or disagreed with the following statements: a) “the balance of nature is 
very delicate and easily upset by human activities,” b) “modifying the 
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environment for human use seldom causes serious problems,” c) “the 
earth is like a spaceship, with only limited room and resources,” d) 
“there are no limits to growth for nations like the United States,” e) 
“plants and animals do not exist primarily to be used by humans,” and 
f) “mankind was created to rule over the rest of nature.” 
The six NEP measures were measured on a scale that ranged 
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree), and then combined into 
a single mean environmental values scale with questions b, d, and f 
reverse coded (the resulting scale ranged from 1 - 7; M = 5.04; SD = 
1.14). Cronbach’s alpha for the resulting scale was .64; while the 
reliability is below 0.7, it falls within the range that other researchers 
have identified for this abbreviated version of the full scale (see Pierce, 
Lovrich, Tsurutani, & Abe, 1987, for comparisons). 
 
Experimental conditions. Dummy variables were coded to 
indicate whether the subject was in the out-group condition (33.3%), in-
group condition (33.3%), or control condition (33.3%), with the control 
condition as the reference group. In addition, a dichotomous variable 
indicating whether a respondent in the out-group condition was 
exposed to a story set in either France or Georgia was included in the 
analysis, with France coded high (16.7%), as an additional control. 
 
Dependent Variable. The dependent variable in the analysis 
was support for government action on climate mitigation. Participants 
were asked how much they agreed with the following statements: 1) 
“We should immediately increase government regulation on industries 
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and businesses that produce a great deal of greenhouse emissions,” 
and 2) “We should immediately increase taxes on industries and 
businesses that produce a great deal of greenhouse emissions.” These 
statements were chosen to present experimental participants with 
general climate policies that mirror those proposed by leading 
politicians for climate legislation (Voorhees & Bravender, 2010). The 
two questions were then combined into a single mean support for 
government policy scale (the resulting mean scale had a range of 1-7; 
M = 5.13; SD = 1.80). The two measures had a significant Pearson 
correlation of 0.753, p < 0.001. 
 
Results 
The results of the OLS regression predicting support for 
government climate mitigation policy are presented in Table 2 with 
standardized beta coefficients and significance reported. Model 1 tests 
the effects of in-group and out-group message exposure on support for 
climate mitigation compared to control (H1) while model 2 tests for the 
interaction between political party identification and the identity of the 
victim (H2). A graph of the interaction between political party 
identification and victim identity from model 2 is provided in Figure 1. 
The results in model one failed to support H1, with support for 
climate mitigation not significantly varying with the degree of audience 
identification with the groups featured in the stories. The in-group 
(β=.04, ns) and the out-group (β=-.10, ns) message conditions did not 
differ significantly from the control group in policy preferences. The 
only significant predictors of support for government action on climate 
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mitigation in Model 1 were political partisanship (β=-.21, p ≤ .001) and 
belief in human-induced global warming (β=.35, p ≤ .001). 
However, the influence of message exposure on support for 
climate mitigation was contingent upon political partisanship (in 
support of H2). The results from model 2 indicate that exposure to the 
out-group message condition decreased support (β=-.32, p ≤ .05) for 
climate mitigation more for Republican subjects compared to others. 
However, political partisanship was not a significant moderator on 
identification when comparing the in-group message condition to the 
control condition. (β=-.07, ns). This indicates that climate change 
messages focusing on out-group victims may boomerang amongst 
Republicans.
Table 2 
OLS Regression Predicting Support for Climate Mitigation Policies 
Predictors Model 1 Model 2 
Control Variables 
Environmental Values .35** .33** 
Political Partisanship (Strong Republican) -.21** -.10 
Role of Government (conservative) .11 .11 
Belief in Human-Induced GW .17* .16** 
Experimental Conditions 
In-group Identity Message .04 .10 
Out-group Identity Message -.10 .17 
France Message -.01 -.02 
Interactions 
In-group X Partisanship -.07 
Out-group X Partisanship -.32* 





Figure 1. Interaction between political party identification and 
experimental condition on support for climate mitigation policies. 
Discussion 
 This study finds that informational news stories about climate 
change can be interpreted differently depending on the partisanship of 
the message receiver, demonstrating the important role that motivated 
cognition plays in the interpretation and application of messages 
discussing scientific issues such as climate change and calls into 
question the traditional deficit model of science communication.  
 Hypotheses 1 was not supported in this study; support for 
climate mitigation policies did not vary overall by degree of audience 
identification with potential victims highlighted in climate change 
messages. The effect of social identification on policy preferences was 
completely contingent on political partisanship. A possible explanation 
41 
for this null finding is that the identity manipulation in this study may 
have been too subtle and weak, especially in terms of out-group 
identification.  Future research may build from this study to examine 
how different levels of vividness of social identity cues may moderate 
message effects, and also generally examine how social identity cues 
have been embedded in climate change news frames, as this analysis 
has not been included in recent content analyses (e.g. Boykoff & 
Boykoff, 2007; Boykoff & Boykoff, 2004; Weingart, Engels, & 
Pansegrau, 2000). In addition, social identification with potential 
victims may play either a greater or a smaller role in audience 
perceptions about science issues with little or no political polarization; 
thus, examining the role of social identity cues within other issue 
contexts is also desirable. 
 Hypothesis 2 was supported in this study: the effect of message 
exposure on support for climate mitigation policies was contingent 
upon subjects’ political predispositions. The results indicated that 
message exposure activated motivated reasoning in subjects, which 
increased polarization between Democrats and Republicans in policy 
preferences. Among Democrats exposure to either in-group and out-
group messages increased support for climate mitigation. At the same 
time, support for climate mitigation among Republican subjects 
significantly declined compared to the control group, especially after 
exposure to the out-group message.  
 These findings have implications for science communicators and 
our understanding of how media coverage of climate change is likely to 
influence public opinion. As previously mentioned, Mutz (2008) asserts 
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that exposure to media messages, regardless of the source, about 
contentious issues such as climate change is likely to activate political 
predispositions and increase political polarization about the issue due 
to the activation of biased information processes amongst audiences. 
This study’s findings are consistent with this argument – political 
polarization on support for climate mitigation policies increased 
significantly after message exposure to news stories discussing out-
group populations.  
News stories often highlight the impact of climate change on 
different parts of the world.  The results of this study suggest that 
broad public exposure to news stories discussing the impacts of 
climate change on outside the United States is likely to amplify the 
American partisan divide on climate mitigation policies. 
These results are especially important for science 
communicators in light of the fact that, to date, the dominant 
approach used for communicating about science issues is the deficit 
model of science communication (Bauer, Allum, & S. Miller, 2007). 
Under the deficit model approach, or “science literacy” approach, 
media and education programs are utilized to provide the public with 
more facts and increase general knowledge about a science issues 
such as climate change. The underlying assumption of these efforts is 
that if the general public has more information about climate change 
individuals will adopt views in line with scientific experts. Recent 
scholarly work has been critical of this approach (e.g. Nisbet, 2005; 
Nisbet & Goidel, 2007) and points to errors in the assumptions under 
the scientific literacy approach. Critics assert that strong value and 
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ideological orientations may act as a perceptual screen (Goidel, 
Shields, & Peffley, 1997) that influences audiences to select and 
privilege a subset of considerations that are consistent or reinforce 
their predispositions. For example, Nisbet (2005) found that ideological 
and religious worldviews strongly moderated the impact of increased 
information awareness on public support for embryonic-stem cell 
research. Likewise, Druckman & Bolsen (2009) found that audience 
responses to factual messages about emerging technologies were 
heavily contingent on their ideological predispositions. Results from 
the study presented here point to similar perceptual screens. 
Science communicators may reduce the likelihood of activating 
unintended constructs by focusing on messages that target specific 
segments of the public. Audience segmentation analysis (Maibach, 
Roser-Renouf, & Leiserowitz, 2009) and ongoing framing research on 
science and technology issues (Nisbet, 2009; Nisbet & Scheufele, 2009) 
may provide useful tools for targeting messages to different population 
segments.  
This study suggests that when creating general messages for the 
public, science communicators and environmental organizations can 
lower the risk of creating a boomerang effect amongst conservative 
segments of the population by focusing on implications for local areas 
when discussing the impact that climate change may be having on 
distant populations. While this may not always be possible, this study 
demonstrates that focusing on distant impacts of global phenomena 
such as climate change is likely to amplify polarization. 
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In conclusion, this study demonstrates how the impact of 
messages concerning climate change may be moderated by political 
partisanship and social identification. As research on effective science 
communication continues, it will be important to identify how 
messages may amplify or attenuate political polarization about 
controversial science issues. The current elite discourse, in which 
Democratic political leaders have continued to push for legislation on 
greenhouse gases while Republican leaders have argued against 
government regulation, suggests that climate change beliefs will 





ONE OR MANY? THE INFLUENCE OF EPISODIC AND THEMATIC 
CLIMATE CHANGE FRAMES ON POLICY PREFERENCES AND 
INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR CHANGE 
  
This chapter examines a complementary message structure to 
social identity by examining the impact of messages that present the 
impact of climate change episodically or thematically. An episodic 
frame provides a case study of the issue (e.g. the impact of climate 
change on an individual), while a thematic frame provides general 
trends and information about an issue (e.g. general trends of the 
impact of climate change) (Iyengar, 1994).  
This chapter will focus on the impact of episodic and thematic 
frames in the framing process and present results from an experiment 
that examines the relative impact of using an episodic or a thematic 
frame to discuss the effects of climate change on polar bears. To the 
best of my knowledge, this study is the first to examine the impacts of 
using episodic and thematic frames in the context of climate change. It 
is also the first that I am aware of to examine episodic and thematic 
framing in a context in which the experimental participants cannot 
help the victim(s) directly, but instead must rely on collective action to 
do so. Specifically, this study looks at how episodic and thematic 
framing of climate change influences the perception of who is 
responsibility for addressing climate change, support for policies that 
address climate change, predispositions for individual behavior 
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change, concern for the polar bear(s) featured in the story, and the 




Episodic and Thematic Frames 
Iyengar (1990, 1994) performed some of the most influential 
studies on episodic and thematic framing. Most relevant to this study 
are Iyengar’s (1994) experimental tests of how presenting participants 
with different poverty frames in news stories could significantly change 
whether the responsibility for poverty was assigned to the 
impoverished individual or to society at large. Iyengar found that when 
poverty was framed as a general outcome, with an inclusion of general 
statistics and causes of poverty (thematic framing), individuals would 
generally assign responsibility for poverty to society at large; however, 
when poverty was framed as a description of an individual who was 
impoverished (episodic framing), individuals would generally assign 
responsibility for poverty to the impoverished individual. Related to the 
research presented here, Iyengar (1990, 1994) found that attribution 
of treatment responsibility was a critical mediator for the belief that 
the government should take action to address an issue. Additionally, 
when participants were presented with a thematic frame, their 
increased attribution of responsibility to societal factors increased 
their support of government policies to address the respective public 
issue. Attribution of treatment responsibility is thus included in this 
study to see if the use of episodic or thematic frames impacts 
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attribution of responsibility to address climate change and subsequent 
policy support. 
 
The Role of Emotion in Episodic and Thematic Framing 
In addition to attribution of responsibility, emotion plays a key 
role in decision making about individual behavior change and policy 
support. In the arena of policy support, individuals often rely on 
cognitive shortcuts when making decision about policies (Zaller, 1992) 
and use affective heuristics to guide decision-making (Brader, 2006; 
Neuman, Marcus, Crigler, & Mackuen, 2007; Sniderman, Brody, & 
Tetlock, 1993). In other words, individuals will often rely on their 
emotional response to an issue to guide their opinion towards the 
enactment of related policies. To the best of my knowledge no 
researchers have examined how episodic and thematic framing may 
impact emotion related to support or opposition to the implementation 
of government policies. However, researchers have examined episodic 
and thematic framing in relation to individual behavior when a 
participant can directly help an individual in need. Kogut and Ritov 
(2005a, 2005b), Slovic (2007), and Small, Loewenstein, and Slovic 
(2007) have found that a single identifiable victim is more effective at 
eliciting donations for victims in need than the use of multiple 
identifiable victims or the use of thematic statistics. Kogut and Ritov 
(2005a, 2005b), found that when an experimental participant was 
presented with a short narrative of an identified victim (meaning that 
the name, age, and picture of the victim are provided to the 
participant) in need of help, the participant was more likely to feel 
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distress and be more willing to offer a contribution to help the victim 
alone compared to a small group of identified victims.  
Individuals tend to have stronger affective responses towards an 
identified individual and express a greater willingness to help an 
identified individual compared to an unidentified individual (Small & 
Loewenstein, 2003). Small and Loewenstein suggest that this may be 
because individuals often use proportions to assign value to a helping 
behavior and find greater satisfaction in helping when they can raise 
the proportion of victims helped compared to victims in need (i.e. a 
helper will feel better about helping 10 out of 200 victims compared to 
helping 10 out of 2,000,000 victims). When a person sees a story 
about an identified victim, the identified victims plight becomes the 
salient object of need rather than the needs of all victims. This creates 
a salient helping ratio of 1 victim helped : 1 victim in need. In contrast, 
with an unidentified individual participants are more likely to think 
about similar cases (the uniqueness of the victim is not salient), and 
thus have a much smaller perceived proportion of victims helped 
compared to victims in need. 
Slovic (2007) proposes that the identified victim effect may also 
be driven by participants paying more attention to the individual 
victim than the group of victims (supported by Susskind, Maurer, 
Thakkar, Hamilton, & Sherman, 1999), which heightens the intensity 
of feeling that they have in response to the victim. The feeling the 
individual experiences contributes to how much they are willing to 
help the victim. This leads to the basic helping model of: 
Imagery & Attention Æ Feeling Æ Helping. 
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Slovic (2007) and Kogut and Ritov (2005a, 2005b) propose that 
the results are driven, in part, by the different ways that participants 
respond to narratives about individuals and groups. Single individuals 
serve as coherent psychological units and individuals are more likely 
to make more extreme attributions and make a requested judgment 
faster and with greater confidence for individuals compared with 
groups (Hamilton & Sherman, 1996; Susskind et al., 1999). Part of 
this process may be tied to the strength of narratives for 
interpretation, with the individual making a more coherent and 
understandable narrative focus than groups of individuals.  
This narrative process may also influence the degree to which 
participants empathize with the victim and feel personally distressed 
upon hearing about the condition of the victim. Willingness to help a 
victim has been tied to feelings of empathy (Batson et al., 1991) and 
distress (Kogut & Ritov, 2005a, 2005b). Kogut & Ritov (2005a, 2005b) 
do not find a significant correlation between empathy and willingness 
to contribute (they ascribe this to a social desirability bias of their 
participants) but do find a significant correlation between distress and 
willingness to contribute. Previous research does suggest that feelings 
of distress and empathy should operate differently in guiding helping 
behavior. Eisenberg and Miller (1987), in a widely cited meta-review on 
empathy and altruism, find that while empathy is significantly 
correlated to altruistic behavior (a subset of prosocial behavior), 
distress is likely to cause egoistically motivated prosocial behavior, in 
which the desire is to remove the negative feeling associated with being 
in a state of distress. 
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This study examines how support for government policy and 
individual behavior change may be affected by the thematic and 
episodic presentation of the effects of climate change on polar bears 
through the mediators of attribution of treatment responsibility, 
emotional response, and concern for the victim(s). Because individuals 
face many structural barriers to personally attenuate the impacts of 
climate change, and are likely to believe that others will not voluntarily 
take action to help with the cause, it is expected that episodic and 
thematic message framing will have a limited effect on predispositions 
for individual behavior change. It is important to note that this 
prediction contrasts with the findings of Slovic (2007), Kogut and Ritov 
(2005a, 2005b) and Small et al. (2007). The main reason for the 
difference is that while individuals in the studies of Slovic, Kogut and 
Ritov, and Small et al. could easily see how their individual 
contribution could directly change the lives of the victims in need, 
individual behavior change to help climate change victims typically 
relies on the collective action of multiple individuals to make a 
significant change; the behavior of the individual, if not paired with 
collective action, will not have any impact on the life of the victim(s) in 
need.  
While the message framing used in this experiment is not 
expected to influence individual behavior change, the research 
performed by Iyengar (1990, 1994) suggests that thematic framing of 
the issue, compared to episodic framing, will lead to a greater 
treatment responsibility assigned to governments who can make broad 
systemic changes to attenuate negative environmental effects and 
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improve the lives of animals. The greater assignment of responsibility 
may, in turn, lead to a support for government policies that address 
climate change. Finally, the literature cited above suggests that the 
emotional response to the message and concern for the polar bear(s) 
may mediate the framing effect. However, because the context of this 
study differs substantially from the previous research it is unclear 
whether the episodic and thematic frames used in this study will 
significantly impact the participants’ emotional response and concern 
for the polar bear. 
Formally stated, this study investigates the following hypotheses 
and research question: 
H1: There will be no difference in predispositions for individual 
behavior change for individuals who see a thematic frame 
compared to participants who see an episodic frame. 
H2: A thematic frame will lead to more support for government 
policies that address climate change than an episodic frame. 
H3: The relationship between message framing and support for 
government policies will be mediated by assignment of treatment 
responsibility, emotional response, and concern for the victim. 
RQ1: What role will emotional responses and concern for the 










As with all of the experiments in this dissertation, participants 
were recruited from shopping malls in upstate New York with a sign 
that stated they would receive $5 in compensation for completing an 
experimental study. Every participant signed an IRB approved consent 
form before being directed to a private location to complete the study. 
All participants in a stimulus condition first read a story about the 
effects of climate change (the story differed by study and condition) 
and then filled out a questionnaire (the questionnaire also differed by 
study and condition). Participants in the control condition only filled 
out the questionnaire. In all of the studies, no participant took longer 
than 15 minutes to complete the experiment. 
 
Participants 
Participants in Study 2 were non-student adults (N=120; mean 
age = 42 years; age range = 18 - 86 years; 48% female).  
 
Experimental Design and stimulus 
The research questions were investigated using a 2 experimental 
condition plus control design. Participants were randomly assigned to 
one of the 3 conditions, with 40 individuals in each condition. 
Participants assigned to one of the two experimental conditions 
(episodic or thematic) read a fabricated news story about the effect of 
climate change on polar bears, while participants in the control 
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condition were not exposed to a news story. While the news stories 
presented to participants were constructed for this experiment, the 
information used was taken from stories that the Associated Press had 
run on climate change affecting polar bears and the Arctic. Following 
Iyengar’s (1990, 1994) differentiation between episodic and thematic 
conditions, the episodic condition in this experiment presented a story 
that focused on one polar bear that was struggling to survive as 
climate change melted ice in the Arctic. In the thematic condition, the 
story discussed statistics about the impact that climate change was 
having on all polar bears and the Arctic. For example, the headline of 
the episodic condition read “Polar bear struggles for food in the Arctic,” 
while the headline for the thematic condition read “Thousands of polar 
bears struggle for food in the Arctic.” The text for the stories is 




Control variables. Because climate change is both an 
environmental and political issue, environmental values and political 
party identification were measured to be used as control variables. 
Environmental values were determined by using the same 
shortened 6-item version of the New Environmental Paradigm (NEP) 
scale (Dunlap, 2008) that participants used for study 1. (The resulting 
scale ranged from 1 - 7; M = 5.42; SD = 1.08). Cronbach’s alpha for 
the resulting scale was .63. 
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Political party was measured by asking respondents to answer 
the question "generally speaking, when it comes to political parties in 
the United States, how would you describe yourself?" The question 
was measured on a seven point scale ranging from 1 (strong Democrat) 
to 7 (strong Republican) (M = 3.6; SD = 1.88). 
 
Mediating Variables. The emotional response to the message 
was determined by asking respondents how much they agreed with the 
following two statements: a) "After reading the story I felt anxious," 
and b) "After reading the story I felt worried." The two measures were 
measured on a scale that ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 
(strongly agree) and then combined into a single mean emotion scale 
(the resulting mean scale had a range of 1 - 7; M = 4.04; SD = 1.73). 
The two measures had a significant Pearson correlation of 0.756, p < 
0.001. 
Concern for the polar bear(s) featured in the story was 
determined by asking respondents to answer the following two 
questions: a) "Overall, how worried are you about the polar bear(s) 
featured in the story?" and b) "Overall, how concerned are you about 
the polar bear(s) featured in the story?" The two questions were 
measured on a scale that ranged from 1 (not worried/concerned at all) 
to 7 (extremely worried/concerned) and then combined into a single 
mean concern scale (the resulting mean scale had a range of 1 - 7; M = 
5.06; SD = 1.57). The two questions had a significant Pearson 
correlation of 0.951, p<0.001. 
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Government treatment responsibility for climate change was 
measured by asking respondents to indicate how much responsibility 
each of the following groups has for addressing climate change: a) "The 
U.S. Government," and b) "Governments of other countries." The two 
questions were measured on a scale that ranged from 1 (no 
responsibility) to 7 (great deal of responsibility) and then combined 
into a single mean government treatment responsibility scale (the 
resulting aggregate scale had a range of 1 - 7; M = 6.12; SD = 1.37). 
The two measurements had a significant Pearson correlation of 0.86, p 
< 0.001. 
Individual treatment responsibility measures the treatment 
responsibility placed on individuals to take action on climate change 
using the self as a reference point. This was measured by asking 
respondents to indicate how much responsibility "people like me" had 
for addressing global climate change. The question was measured on a 
scale that ranged from 1 (no responsibility) to 7 (a great deal of 
responsibility) (M = 5.15; SD = 1.67). 
 
Dependent Variables. Support for government policy was 
determined by asking respondents to state how much they agreed or 
disagreed with the following two statements: a) "We should 
immediately increase government regulation on industries and 
businesses that produce a great deal of greenhouse emissions," and b) 
"We should immediately increase taxes on industries and businesses 
that produce a great deal of greenhouse emissions." The two measures 
were measured on a scale that ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 
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(strongly agree) and then aggregated into a single mean support for 
government policy scale (the resulting mean scale had a range of 1-7; 
M = 5.46; SD = 1.71). The two measures had a significant Pearson 
correlation of 0.704, p < 0.001. 
Support for individual behavior change was measured by asking 
respondents how likely they are to take each of the following actions to 
reduce their own greenhouse gas emissions: a) "buy compact 
fluorescent bulbs," b) "spend $5 more a month for electricity produced 
from renewable energy sources, like wind and air," c) "use less air 
conditioning in the summer," and d) "turn down the thermostat in the 
winter." The four measures were measured on a seven point scale that 
ranged from 1 (not at all likely) to 7 (extremely likely) and then 
combined into a single mean behavior change scale (the resulting 
mean scale had a range of 1 - 7; M = 5.21; SD = 1.53). Cronbach’s 
alpha for the resulting scale was .76. 
 
Data Analysis 
 ANOVAs and a chi-square test were first used to identify 
whether demographics or the values of the control variables 
significantly differed by condition. ANCOVAs were then used to 
examine whether the conditions had any overall effect on the two 
dependent variables. ANCOVAs were run to allow for participants’ 
environmental values and political party identification to be controlled, 
as these variables are correlated with support for climate mitigation 
policies (Maibach et al., 2009). This study then examined indirect 
effects between the experimental condition and the dependent 
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variables with a bootstrapped multiple mediator model with bias 
corrected confidence intervals as recommended by Preacher and Hayes 
(2008). This approach allows for the comparison of multiple mediators 
and for the investigation of indirect effects through specific mediators 
while controlling for the variance shared with other mediators and 
covariates. The use of bootstrapping holds advantages over other tests 
for indirect effects, such as the Sobel test (Sobel, 1982), because it 




No differences were found between conditions for the 
demographics of gender (χ2 (2, N = 120) = 0.34, p = n.s.) and age (F(2, 
116) = 0.05, p = n.s.) or the control variables of environmental values 
(F(2, 116) = 0.069, p = n.s.) and political orientation (F(2, 116) = 0.514, 
p = n.s.). To gauge the overall effect of episodic and thematic framing 
on the two dependent variables two ANCOVAs were run. The first 
examined the framing impact of the respective conditions on 
predispositions for individual behavior change and the second 
examined the framing impact of the conditions on support for 
government policies that address climate change. In both ANCOVAs 
the participants’ scores on the environmental values scale (NEP) and 
the political party identification were used as covariates. 
The first ANCOVA examined whether there were differences 
between the experimental conditions (episodic, thematic, and control) 
in participants’ support for individual behavior change. There was no 
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significant effect for environmental values (F(1, 115) = 0.88, p = n.s., 
ηp2 = 0.01) or political party (F(1, 115)=0.01, p= n.s., ηp2 = 0.00) on 
support for individual behavior change. After controlling for the effects 
of NEP and party identification the condition the participant was 
placed in did not have a significant effect on support for individual 
behavior change (F(2, 115) = 1.051, p = n.s., ηp2 = 0.01), which does not 
falsify H1. 
The second ANCOVA examined whether there were differences 
between the experimental conditions (episodic, thematic, and control) 
in participants’ support for government policies. The covariates NEP 
(F(1, 116) = 46.07, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.16) and political party 
identification (F(1, 116) = 3.97, p < 0.05, ηp2 = 0.033) were both 
significantly related to support for government policies. After 
controlling for the effects of NEP and party identification the condition 
the participant was placed in did have a significant effect on support 
for government policy (F(2, 116) = 3.23, p < 0.05, ηp2 = 0.053). 
Bonferroni post-hoc tests found that participants in the episodic 
condition supported government policies to address climate change 
significantly less than participants in the thematic condition (p < 0.05; 
the 95% CI for the mean difference had a lower bound of -1.67 and an 
upper bound of -.024), which provides support for H2. All other 
Bonferroni post-hoc comparisons for this ANCOVA were not 
significant.  
Using the method outlined in Preacher and Hayes (2008), two 
bootstrapped multiple mediator models were also run examining the 
effect of episodic and thematic framing on support for 1) individual 
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behavior change and 2) policy change through direct pathways and 
indirect pathways mediated by emotional response, concern for the 
victim, attribution of individual treatment responsibility, and 
attribution of government treatment responsibility while controlling for 
NEP scores and political party identification. These mediation tests 
only looked at the difference between the episodic and thematic 
conditions (the control condition was omitted) as the mediation 
variables of emotional response and concern for the victim in response 
to the story could only be asked in these two conditions (the control 
condition did not have a story to respond to or a victim to be 
concerned for). This left a total n of 80 for each mediation model. 
The results for the first mediation model examining the mediated 
relationship between story framing and predispositions for individual 
behavior change are depicted in Table 3 and Figure 2.  
While there was no overall effect for episodic vs. thematic frame 
on individual behavior, it is still possible for mediated effects to occur 
as some mediators may suppress the indirect effects of others. 
However, as shown in Table 3 none of the indirect effects were 
significant at the .05 level. This is shown in Table 3, where the lower 
and upper bounds of the 95% confidence intervals for the indirect 
effects are portrayed. If both the lower and upper bound are above or 
below zero, the results demonstrate that there is 95% certainty that an 
indirect effect is occurring. However, if 0 is included in the 95% 
confidence interval (i.e. if the lower bound is negative and the upper 




Mediation of the Effect of Thematic Frames compared to Episodic 
Frames on Support for Individual Behavior Change to Address 
Climate Change through Individual Treatment Responsibility, 
Government Treatment Responsibility, Emotional Response, and 




 Point Estimate Lower Upper
 Indirect Effects 
Individual Treatment Responsibility 0.029 -0.081 0.189
Government Treatment Responsibility -0.045 -0.156 0.034
Emotional Response 0.052 -0.044 0.215
Concern for Polar Bears 0.018 -0.025 0.161
    
 Contrasts 
Emotion vs. Individual 0.023 -0.151 0.219
Government vs. Individual -0.077 -0.329 0.053
Concern vs. Individual -0.013 -0.188 0.129
Emotion vs. Government 0.100 -0.025 0.299
Emotion vs. Concern 0.036 -0.067 0.300
Concern vs. Government 0.064 -0.038 0.284
 
indirect effect is occurring. Table 3 shows that none of the lower and 
upper bounds of the confidence intervals are fully above or below zero 
for any of the indirect effects on individual behavior change. Table 3 
also presents tests of contrast between the indirect effects. These 
results are included in the part of the table labeled “contrasts” and can 
be interpreted in a similar manner to the indirect effects. If the upper 
and lower bounds of the 95% confidence intervals for the contrast test 
between two indirect effects are fully above or below zero then there is 
at least 95% certainty that one indirect effect is having a greater 
impact than the contrasted indirect effect. As shown in Table 3, none 





















Figure 2. Unstandardized solution for the mediation of the effect of 
thematic frames compared to episodic frames on support for individual 
behavior change to address climate change. 
Mediated Framing Effect on Support for Individual Behavior 
Change 





































The model does find evidence for discriminant validity between 
attribution of individual treatment responsibility and attribution of 
government treatment responsibility, as there is no significant direct 
link between the mediating variable attribution of government 
treatment responsibility and individual behavior change but there is a 
significant link between attribution of individual treatment 
responsibility and individual behavior change (B = 0.39, p < 0.05). 
There was also a significant link between condition and assignment of 
government treatment responsibility (B = 0.30, p < 0.05) and between 
emotional response and individual behavior change (B = 0.26, p < 
0.05). No other links were significant. 
The results for the second mediation model examining the 
mediated relationship between episodic vs. thematic frame and 
support for government policies are depicted in Table 4 and Figure 3. 
These results may be interpreted in a similar manner to those found in 
Table 3. 
In support of H2 there was a significant overall effect for support 
for government policies for thematic framing compared to episodic 
framing (B = 0.42, p < 0.05) (in partial support of H3). As shown in 
Table 4, only government treatment responsibility was a significant 
mediator of condition on support for government policies (B=0.15, 
p<0.05). Contrast tests found that the indirect effect of government 
treatment responsibility is greater than the indirect effect individual 
treatment responsibility with 95% confidence, but not significantly 
different from the other indirect effects. In addition, the direct link 
between emotional response and support for government policies is 
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significant (B = 0.37, p < 0.05). No other links were significant, 
including the direct link between condition and support for 
government policies in the mediated model. 
 
Table 4 
Mediation of the Effect of Thematic Frames compared to Episodic 
Frames on Support for Government Policies to Address Climate 
Change through Individual Treatment Responsibility, Government 







Estimate Lower Upper 
 Indirect Effects 
Individual Treatment Responsibility 0.008 -0.108 0.017 
Government Treatment 
Responsibility 0.146 0.029 0.325 
Emotional Response 0.082 -0.039 0.277 
Concern for Polar Bears -0.001 -0.076 0.070 
    
 Contrasts 
Emotion vs. Individual 0.090 -0.045 0.306 
Government vs. Individual 0.154 0.020 0.347 
Concern vs. Individual 0.008 -0.059 0.130 
Emotion vs. Government -0.064 -0.260 0.150 
Emotion vs. Concern 0.083 -0.042 0.357 





















Figure 3. Unstandardized solution for the mediation of the effect of 
thematic frames compared to episodic frames on support for 
government policies to address climate change. 
 
Mediated Framing Effect on Support for Government Policies 






































This study is the first to examine the role that episodic and 
thematic presentations of climate change victims may have on 
individual behavior change and support for climate mitigation policies. 
It finds that while there was no impact on individual behavior change, 
thematic framing of climate change victims compared to episodic 
framing significantly increased policy support through the mediator of 
attribution of government responsibility. The difference between 
individual behavior change and policy preferences may be explained by 
the fact that broad government actions can have significant actions on 
large environmental issues such as climate change, while individual 
actions will not have a significant impact unless a large collective of 
individuals take action. When an individual is uncertain about the 
impact that their individual actions may have, this study 
demonstrates that messages are likely to be more effective in driving 
support for policy support rather than individual behavior change . 
It is important to note that this is only one study on the impact 
of episodic and thematic framing of climate change, and caution 
should be taken in generalizing to both climate change messages and 
prosocial messages in general. Future research needs to identify how 
different types of victim exemplars and how the ability of participants 
to directly help the victim in need impacts the effects of thematic and 
episodic frames. Future research may also investigate the impact of 
combining episodic and thematic frames in a climate change context. 
Small et al. (2007) did find that individuals donated less to an 
identifiable victim paired with statistics than to an identified victim 
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alone, but this pattern may be reversed if the individuals are 
considering policies addressing an issue in which they cannot directly 
help the victim. 
This study presents a situation in which individuals are asked to 
help animals in need in a context in which collective action is needed 
for aid to be delivered. This differs from the work of Slovic (2007), 
Kogut & Ritov (2005a, 2005b), and Small et al. (2007) by changing 
both the type of exemplar (polar bears vs. children) and the ability of 
the participant to help the victim. While previous research has found 
that animals have been anthropomorphized in the media (Chris, 2006) 
and there are multiple stories of individuals undertaking personal 
sacrifice to save animals in need (Slovic, 2007), it is possible that 
differences between this study and previous studies was also driven by 
differences in exemplar type. The study also does not find a difference 
in emotional response that was present in other studies, but this may 
be because no visual imagery was provided in this study, and visual 
imagery, rather than textual cues, may have driven the emotional 
differences of the previous studies.  
With these cautions in place, this study does appear to support 
the contention that individuals will be resistant to messages calling for 
individual behavior change in relation to issues that require collective 
action (Ockwell et al., 2009) and finds evidence that thematic frames 
are more effective at driving policy support on an issue that requires 
collective action. 
Looking at the direct impacts of the mediating variables on 
individual behavior change and policy preferences, this study found 
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that changes in attribution for individual treatment responsibility only 
had an impact on individual behavior while changes in attribution for 
government treatment responsibility only had an impact on policy 
preferences. This suggests that appeals for action need to be targeted 
carefully to the desired corresponding behavior – an appeal that 
effectively increases an individual’s attribution of individual treatment 
responsibility is likely to increase predispositions for individual 
behavior change, but is also unlikely to change policy preferences 
unless the appeal can shift attribution for government treatment 
responsibility as well. 
In addition to attributions of treatment responsibility, this study 
examined how emotional response to the message and concern for the 
victim affected individual behavior change and policy preferences. 
While emotion was significantly associated with individual behavior 
change and policy preferences, concern for the victim was not 
associated with either dependent variable when shared variance across 
other variables was taken into account. These results are similar to 
those found by Kogut and Ritov (2005a, 2005b) and suggest that 
strategies for motivating action will be more effective if they can create 
a feeling of anxiety or worry in the receiver, which the receiver can 
relieve through the desired action, than if they attempt to create a 
feeling of concern or worry for the victim. 
The results of this study also suggest that media coverage of 
climate change may inhibit thematic considerations of the issue and 
support of government policies to support the issue. Boykoff and 
Boykoff (2007) found that journalistic norms cause the media to cover 
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climate change primarily episodically, which, based on the results 
from this study, may cause the viewing public to assign less treatment 
responsibility to the government and subsequently have less support 
for government policies that address climate change. From an applied 
perspective, this study also suggests that climate change advocates 
will be more successful in increasing public support for climate 
mitigation policies if the impacts of climate change are described in 
thematic rather than episodic terms. 
This study has found that in situations when individual 
behavior change cannot make a significant direct impact on a victim in 
need without a collective movement of similar behavior change, 
message effects are likely to only affect attribution for government 
treatment responsibility and policy support. Future research along 
these lines can help advocates, scientists, and interested parties 
develop strategies to communicate effectively with the lay public about 




THE ROLE OF NUMERACY IN MODERATING THE INFLUENCE OF 
STATISTICS IN CLIMATE CHANGE FRAMES 
 
The previous chapters examined the impact of using an episodic 
or thematic theme to depict climate impacts, and the moderating role 
of political partisanship on discussing climate change impacts in 
terms of in-groups and out-groups. This study presented here 
examines a complimentary structural component - the impact that the 
absence or presence of statistics in climate change frames has on an 
individual’s willingness to donate to organizations working on the 
issue of climate change, and how the effect may be moderated by the 
ability of the individual to understand and manipulate numbers. 
The question of what type of quantitative evidence is most 
effective in supporting arguments has been a pervasive question in the 
field of communication. It is a critical area of research from an applied 
perspective, as science communicators are faced with the choice of 
whether, and in what format, numeric information may be included in 
messages about issues such as climate change. A substantial amount 
of research has examined what numeric formats are most effective in 
aiding the understanding of an issue (e.g. Avorn & Shrank, 2009; 
Gigerenzer, Gaissmaier, Kurz-Milcke, Schwartz, & Woloshin, 2008; 
Halvorsen, Selmer, & Kristiansen, 2007; Schwartz, Woloshin, Black, & 
Welch, 1997; Schwartz, Woloshin, & Welch, 2009). However, there has 
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been a dearth of research examining the impact that choosing to 
include, or not include, numbers in science messages may have.  
In general the scholars in the field of communication have also 
yet to incorporate findings from the field of judgment and decision 
making demonstrating that an individual’s ability to understand and 
interpret numbers is a significant moderator of framing effects in 
general, including numbers (Nelson, Reyna, Fagerlin, Lipkus, & Peters, 
2008; Peters, Hibbard, Slovic, & Dieckmann, 2007; Peters & Levin, 
2008; Peters et al., 2006; Reyna & Brainerd, 2007; Schwartz et al., 
1997). The current study begins to fill this research gap. It examines 
how numeracy may moderate an individual’s predisposition to donate 
to organizations working on the issue of climate change in response to 
reading a news story that includes, or does not include, statistics 




Persuasion and Statistics 
The first studies examining the influence of statistics on 
persuasive messages focused on how message explicitness may 
influence a receiver’s response (Knouse, 1983; Yalch & Elmore-Yalch, 
1984). Under this paradigm, scholars placed a focus on both 
normative standards and the persuasive impact of using a numeric 
representation (e.g. 75%) or a verbal generalization (e.g. most). 
Scholars have generally considered message explicitness, including 
higher levels of quantitative specificity, to be normatively desirable 
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because it makes evidentiary claims more accessible for critical 
analysis (O’Keefe, 2007). Looking at the effect of using or not using 
numeric representations, inconsistencies have been found in studies 
examining how the messages are processed and their subsequent 
persuasive effect. For example, Yalch and Elmore-Yalch (1984) suggest 
that numeric information is more difficult to process than verbal 
information while Viswanathan and Childers (1996) find the opposite 
results. Looking to the persuasive impact of numeric information, a 
meta-analysis performed by O’Keefe (1998) did not find a reliable 
significant effect of quantitative specificity. However, by focusing on 
the level of message explicitness, scholars in this domain of research 
may have failed to explore the potential moderating effect of numeracy. 
In a separate line of communication research, researchers have 
placed a stricter constraint on what is termed a “statistical” frame. 
Under this paradigm, evidence is typically divided between “testimonial 
assertions” and “factual information” (Baesler & Burgoon, 1994, p. 
582), with “statistical evidence” (Allen & Preiss, 1997; Baesler & 
Burgoon, 1994; Hoeken & Hustinx, 2009; Hornikx, 2005). Statistical 
evidence typically refers to a broad aggregation of data, such as a 
study examining multiple cases of an event, while a testimonial 
typically refers to a narrative about a single event. This approach has 
led to the general conclusion that statistical frames are more 
persuasive than narrative frames (Hoeken & Hustinx, 2009), with 
some studies suggesting that this may be moderated by whether the 
message is consistent with the preferences of the message receiver (De 
Wit, Das, & Vet, 2008; Slater & Rouner, 1996). 
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 This definition of what a statistical frame is, however, introduces 
a confounding variable that to the best of my knowledge has not been 
acknowledged or addressed by communication researchers. When 
researchers compare a statistical frame to a narrative frame, they are 
typically manipulating whether the message is episodic and non-
numeric (testimonial) or thematic and numeric (statistical). As an 
example, Hoeken and Hustinx (2009) offered the following anecdotal 
narrative (testimonial) and statistical frames:  
Anecdotal Narratives:  
Study 1: “Thomas Kepers works in a large office in the Randstad 
corporation. He has not had to call in sick since he started using the 
relaxation room on the second floor.” (p. 496) 
Study 2: “Since 72-year old Bernhard can Delft has been online, 
he feels less lonely and cut off from the world around him.”  (p. 500) 
Study 3: “In diner ‘Den dikken dragonder’ in Kerkrade … 
extending the wine last has led to a sharp increase in the drinks 
turnover.” (p. 502) 
Statistical Narratives: 
Study 1: “from 1990 till 2002, a large-scale study was conducted 
on the effects of relaxation facilities at work. In companies offering 
such facilities, absenteeism due to illness occurred 24% less often.” (p. 
496). 
Study 2: “Only 31% of the elderly with access to the Internet 
feels cut off from the world around them. For elderly without access to 
the Internet, this percentage is 64%.” (p. 500) 
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Study 3: “A study among 829 restaurants shows that 
restaurants with an extended wine list have a 23% higher turnover of 
drinks.” (p. 503) 
 Due to the manipulation of the presence or absence of numeric 
information in addition to whether the information is presented 
thematically or episodically, it is it is impossible to parse out whether 
observed affects are due to the inclusion or absence of numbers, or 
instead due to the format of aggregating information or using an 
episodic exemplar-based format. The intention here is not to single out 
Hoeken and Hustinx (2009), as the confounding of these 
manipulations can be found in multiple studies (e.g. Allen & Preiss, 
1997; Artz & Tybout, 1999; Baesler & Burgoon, 1994; De Wit et al., 
2008; Small, Loewenstein, & Slovic, 2007), but rather to note that a 
number of studies in the field of communication do not account for the 
fact that the presence or absence of numbers, independent of other 
manipulations, can drive persuasive effects. Studies from this line of 
research have also not accounted for the moderating role that 
numeracy may play on framing effects (Peters et al., 2006), which will 
be discussed in the following section. 
 
Numeracy and Framing 
When an individual is given risk information about an issue 
such as climate change, they are often required to interpret and utilize 
information regarding the benefits and risks associated with different 
choices and potential outcomes. Risk information is often provided in 
numerical form through a variety of mediums, such as text, tables, 
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and charts. An individual’s ability to understand and use numerical 
information is termed numeracy. 
 While numeracy is a critical skill in decision making, national 
surveys have found that between one-quarter to one-half of Americans 
are not capable of more than basic quantitative tasks (Reyna & 
Brainerd, 2007). For example, in one survey a random sample of 
female veterans in New England were asked to convert a percentage to 
a ratio (1% to 10 in 1,000), a ratio to a percentage, and correctly 
identify how many heads one would expect to come up in 1,000 coin 
flips (Schwartz et al., 1997). These questions were respectively 
answered correctly by 54%, 20%, and 46% of the respondents. The 
surveys indicate that there is a large amount of variance in numeracy 
across the general population. It is also important to note that 
numeracy is best considered a specific type of intelligence, but not a 
proxy for intelligence in general (Peters et al., 2006).  
In light of these findings, some researchers (e.g. Gigerenzer, 
Gaissmaier, Kurz-Milcke, Schwartz, & Woloshin, 2008) have called for 
statistical literacy initiatives to help improve the public’s ability to 
interpret and use numbers. While education initiatives may eventually 
improve general numeracy, it is likely that there will continue to be a 
large variance in the public’s numeric ability in the foreseeable future. 
In light of this, it is necessary to understand how numeracy may 
interact with different formats of information presentation.  
Numeracy has been found to significantly impact decision 
making in a variety of domains (Dieckmann, Slovic, & Peters, 2009). 
Black, Nease, and Tosteson (1995) found that individuals who were 
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low in numeracy felt that they were at a higher risk of breast cancer 
than individuals high in numeracy. Schwartz et al. (1997) found that 
individuals with high numerical ability were better able to use 
information about breast cancer risk reduction associated with 
mammography than those who are low in numeracy. Peters et al. 
(2006) found that individuals high in numeracy tended to extract more 
precise and stronger affective information from numbers and were 
more likely to use correct number principles when interpreting 
numeric information, making them less susceptible to framing effects 
than individuals low in numeracy. For example, Peters et al. found 
that low numerate individuals were sensitive to whether risk 
information was presented in a percentage (10% of 100) or raw count 
(10 out of 100) format, while high numerate individuals were not. 
While a number of studies have examined how numeracy 
moderates the response to different number formats, I am not aware of 
published work that has examined how numeracy may moderate the 
impact of using numeric or verbal descriptions of numeric information. 
While the inconsistencies in the research examining message 
explicitness using numeric and verbal information prevents the 
proposal of a hypothesis for the direction of effect that numbers may 
produce, the work by Peters et al. (2006) and others strongly suggests 
that numeracy will moderate the interpretation of numbers, with low 
numerate individuals affected more by a numeric framing effect than 
high numerate individuals. Formally stated: 
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H1: The format of numeric presentation (verbal vs. numeric) will 
affect message persuasiveness on low numerate individuals and will 





As with all of the experiments in this dissertation, participants 
were recruited from shopping malls in upstate New York with a sign 
that stated they would receive $5 in compensation for completing an 
experimental study. Every participant signed an IRB approved consent 
form before being directed to a private location to complete the study. 
All participants in a stimulus condition first read a story about the 
effects of climate change (the story differed by study and condition) 
and then filled out a questionnaire (the questionnaire also differed by 
study and condition). Participants in the control condition only filled 
out the questionnaire. In all of the studies, no participant took longer 
than 15 minutes to complete the experiment. 
 
Participants 
Participants in Study 3 were non-student adults (N=129; mean 
age = 39.8 years; age range = 18 - 84 years; 49% female). 
 
Experimental Design and stimulus 
The research questions were investigated using a 2 experimental 
condition (statistic vs. verbal descriptor) plus control design. 
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Participants were randomly assigned to one of the 3 conditions, with 
43 individuals in each condition. Participants assigned to one of the 
two experimental conditions read a fabricated news story about the 
effect of climate change on polar bears, while participants assigned to 
the control condition did not view a news story. While the story 
presented to the participants was constructed for this experiment, the 
information used was taken from stories that the Associated Press had 
run on climate change affecting polar bears and the Arctic. The two 
experimental conditions differed by whether they presented a verbal or 
numeric description of the impact that climate change; the numeric 
description was identical to the stimulus used in the thematic 
condition for study 2. The verbal condition included statements such 
as “scientists predict that most polar bears in the world may be killed 
off in the near future because of thinning sea ice from global warming 
the arctic” while the analogous statement in the statistical condition 
was “scientists predict that 12,000 of the 18,000 polar bears in the 
world may be killed off in the near future because of thinning sea ice 
from global warming in the Arctic.” The complete text of the stimulus 




Independent Variables. In addition to the manipulation of what 
condition the individual was placed in, numeracy was measured as a 
potential moderator of using verbal or statistical descriptions on 
donations. Numeracy was measured with the following seven 
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questions taken from a scales developed by Lipkus, Samsa, and Rimer 
(2001) and Frederick (2005): 
From Lipkus et al. (2001): 
1. Which of the following numbers represents the biggest risk of 
getting a disease? ___ 1 in 100, ___ 1 in 1000, __ 1 in 10 
(Answer: 1 in 10) 
2. If the chance of getting a disease is 10%, how many people 
would be expected to get the disease Out of 100?    
(Answer: 10)  
3. In the BIG BUCKS LOTTERY, the chances of winning a $10.00 
prize are 1%. What is your best guess about how many people 
would win a $10.00 prize if 1,000 people each buy a single ticket 
from BIG BUCKS?        
(Answer: 10) 
4. Imagine that we roll a fair, six-sided die 1,000 times. Out of 
1,000 rolls, how many times do you think the die would come 
up as an even number?         
(Answer: 500) 
5. In the ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES, the chance of 
winning a car is 1 in 1,000. What percent of tickets of ACME 
PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES win a car?     
(Answer: 0.1%) 
From Frederick (2005): 
6. In a lake, there is a patch of lilypads. Every day, the patch 
doubles in size. If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the 
entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half of 
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the lake?          
(Answer: 47 days)  
7. A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more 
than the ball. How much does the ball cost?     
(Answer: $0.05) 
This resulted in a scale that had a range of 0 - 7 (Mean = 3.53; 
SD = 1.71), and had a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.660. A median split was 
used to divide participants between those that were considered high 
numerate and low numerate. 
 
Control variables. As with the previous studies, environmental 
values and political party identification were measured to be used as 
control variables. 
Environmental values were determined by using the same 
shortened 6-item version of the New Environmental Paradigm (NEP) 
scale (Dunlap, 2008) used for the previous studies (the resulting scale 
had a range of 1 - 7; M = 5.49; SD = 1.01). Cronbach’s alpha for the 
resulting scale was .61. 
Political party was measured by asking respondents to answer 
the question "Generally speaking, when it comes to political parties in 
the United States, how would you describe yourself" The question was 
measured on a seven point scale ranging from 1 (strong Democrat) to 7 
(strong Republican) (M = 3.8; SD = 1.73). 
 
Dependent Variables. The impact of the message on 
experimental participants was measured by asking participants “How 
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much would you be willing to contribute to organizations working on 
the issue of climate change?” Participants were provided a 6-point 
scale that ranged from $0 to $5, and a blank next to the $5 option to 
allow for larger donations. The responses measured a stated 
willingness to pay rather than actual donations, and any answer 
greater than $5 was coded as $6 to minimize the impact of outlier 
donations. This resulted in a willingness to pay scale that ranged from 




No differences were found between conditions for the 
demographics of gender (χ2 (2, N = 120) = 0.34, p = n.s.), age (F(2, 118) 
= 0.02, p = n.s.), or the control variables of environmental values (F(2, 
120) = 0.18, p = n.s.) and political orientation (F(2, 120) = 0.52, p = 
n.s.). 
 A factorial 2 (numeracy: high, low) x 3 (condition: story with 
statistics, story without statistics, control) ANCOVA was run that 
controlled for environmental values and political orientation. There 
was no significant effect for environmental values (F(1, 113) = .875, p = 
n.s., ηp2 = 0.02) or political party (F(1, 113)=1.854, p= n.s., ηp2 = 0.00) 
on willingness to contribute. After controlling for the effects of NEP 
and party identification, there was a significant interaction between 
condition and numeracy (F(2, 113) = 3.559, p < 0.05, ηp2 = 0.06) and a 
significant main effect for numeracy (F(1, 113) = 5.515, p< 0.05, ηp2 = 
0.05), with individuals low in numeracy donating more than 
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individuals high in numeracy. There was no main effect for condition 
(F(2, 113) = .408, p = n.s., ηp2 = 0.01). The mean willingness to 
contribute for the story with statistics, the story without statistics, and 
the control conditions were respectively $5.10, $3.55, and $3.22 for 
low-numerate participants and $2.38, $3.05, and $3.45 for high 
numerate participants. 
 Looking at low-numerate and high-numerate participants 
separately, there was a significant difference between conditions in 
willingness to donate for low-numerate individuals (F(2, 52) = 3.229, p 
< 0.05, ηp2 = 0.11) while there was no significant difference for high-
numerate individuals (F(2, 59) = 1.029, p = n.s., ηp2 = 0.03), in support 
of H1. Bonferonni post hoc tests showed that for low-numerate 
participants there was a significant difference between participants in 
the statistics condition compared to participants in the control 
condition, p < 0.05, with no other post-hoc tests being significant. 
Please see figure 4 for a visual representation. 
 
Discussion 
 Results of the present study demonstrated that numeracy is a 
significant moderator of the effect that the presence or absence of 
numbers has on how persuasive a message may be. As predicted, 
significant differences arose between the responses to the different 
conditions for low-numerate participants, but did not for high-




Figure 4. The influence of numeracy and the numeric representation of 
risk data on predispositions to donate to organizations working on the 
issue of climate change. 
 
on quantitative specificity, the examination of statistical, episodic, and 
thematic frames, and constructing effective messages about climate 
change. 
If this study had only examined the main effect of the 
experimental conditions, the absence of a significant main effect would 
fit O'Keefe's (1998) finding that there is not reliable significant impact 
of the absence or presence of statistics. However, the finding that 
numeracy is a significant moderator suggests that previous research 
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may have overlooked the effect that including or not including 
numbers may have on low-numerate individuals compared to high-
numerate individuals. This study suggests that research on numeric 
formats may benefit from including measures of numeracy to allow for 
the investigation of possible moderating impacts. Of course, this is 
only one study, and additional replications of this result need to found 
before any firm conclusions can be made. Future research may build 
on the present study to examine how the moderating impact of 
numeracy on the inclusion or absence of numbers may be mediated by 
variables such as perceptions of credibility and the emotional 
resonance of the message. In addition, this study included both raw 
count and percentage formats in the numeric format. Peters et al’s 
(2006) findings suggest that low numerate participants are likely to 
respond differently to percentage and raw count formats, thus future 
research may also build on the research presented here to isolate raw 
count and percentage formats in the comparison with verbal 
representation of quantitative information. 
The present study suggests that studies examining statistical 
frames as thematic, numeric messages compared to episodic, non-
numeric messages may benefit from including numeracy as a 
moderator, and from explicitly manipulating, or controlling for, the 
presence or absence of numbers. This speaks, in part, to study 2 of 
this dissertation. The finding that there is a difference between 
numeric and non-numeric presentation of information for low-
numerate individuals suggest that the findings from study 2 (episodic 
vs. thematic frames) may have been driven, in part, by the inclusion of 
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numbers in the thematic frame. While study 2 demonstrates key 
differences in the impact of episodic and thematic frames when an 
individual can and cannot help a victim through direct individual 
action, future research will be required to explore the role that 
statistics and numeracy play in the effects of study 2 and previous 
research such as Small et al. (2007). The research also implicitly 
suggests that it would be beneficial for researchers performing content 
analyses of news articles to include coding for structural variables 
such as a the presence or absence of statistics.  
This study is consistent with Hoeken and Hustinx's (2009) 
general conclusion that including statistics makes a message more 
persuasive than not including statistics, but does so without the 
conflation of a thematic frame with statistics and suggests that this 
may only be true for individuals who are low in numeracy.  
Looking to future research, it may be beneficial to take note of 
Reinard’s (1988, p. 47) statement that: “methodologically, the failure of 
many researchers to describe the types of evidence they have used … 
has made interpretation of the findings difficult at best. Moreover, 
since some studies have used multiple types of evidence without 
distinguishing their varieties, it frequently is impossible to tell which 
types or combinations of evidence are responsible for all effects.“ 
Reinard called for researchers to parse out what specific message 
manipulations drive effects, but the conflation of statistical and 
thematic frames in a number of studies (Allen & Preiss, 1997; Artz & 
Tybout, 1999; Baesler & Burgoon, 1994; De Wit et al., 2008; Hoeken & 
Hustinx, 2009) demonstrates that this call has often not been heeded. 
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Looking to how statistical frames are defined, research may be 
strengthened by thinking of them in terms of a definition of statistics 
that allows for the examination of different numeric formats and verbal 
descriptions in episodic and thematic frames rather than forcing the 
inclusion of numbers to only occur in thematic messages. Research 
adopting this approach will help to further our understanding of the 
impact that using different numbers has, and how the impacts may be 











Summary of Results 
 The studies included in this dissertation demonstrate the need 
to take structural message manipulations into account when 
designing climate change messages. All three studies focused on 
different ways to discuss the impact that climate change may have on 
potential victims, and found evidence that individuals are often moved 
by interactions between perceptual screens and message content.  
Study 1 found that climate change messages focusing on out-
group victims are likely to generate greater resistance to climate 
change policies amongst politically conservative message receivers 
than if they received no message at all. The results suggest that 
climate change messages designed with good intentions can backfire.  
Study 2 examined the difference between using episodic and 
thematic frames to communicate climate change, and found that 
episodic and thematic framing did not have an impact on 
predispositions for individual behavior change, but that thematic 
framing did increase support for climate mitigation policies relative to 
episodic frames, and that this increase arose through the mediator of 
attribution of government responsibility.  
Study 3 examined how numeracy may moderate the effects of 
numbers being present or absent in messages describing climate 
change victims, and found that low-numerate message receivers were 
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willing to donate more money when given a numeric message, while 
there was no difference between messages for high-numerate receivers. 
 
Future Research Directions 
 The studies, taken together, address the questions of how 
individuals respond to messages discussing who is affected by climate 
change, how many are affected, and the format used to provide 
information about the impact that climate change is likely to have. The 
results also have implications for other issues that prosocial messages 
may be directed towards. Looking at the results of study 1, it is likely 
that messages concerning other controversial issues, such as 
embryonic stem cell research, will have the potential to amplify 
political polarization. A key lesson from study 2 is that when an 
individual cannot make a significant contribution through personal 
behavior change, the impact of episodic and thematic messages may 
be different from situations in which a person can make significant 
contributions individually. Looking at an issue such as genocide, these 
results suggest that episodic and thematic frames may have different 
levels of effectiveness when an individual is asked to help stop a 
conflict (no possibility for an individual contribution, meaning a 
thematic message may be more effective) or to help the victims of a 
conflict (possibility for an individual contribution, meaning an episodic 
message may be more effective). Concerning study 3, numeracy and 
the use of statistics and verbal descriptors are likely to play a 
significant role in how messages are interpreted on essentially any 
topic. Additional research is required, however, to determine how the 
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use of statistics, and different kinds of statistics (e.g. raw count or 
percentage), moderate the impact of a messages that promote 
emotional thinking (episodic messages) or analytical thinking 
(thematic messages). The research questions of studies 1, 2, and 3 
were investigated separately, but the results set the stage for future 
integration and synthesis. The difficulties of integration, however, are 
in the complexity of the myriad ways a message may be constructed.  
 As an example, one can look at the stimulus materials used in 
Small et al. (2007), which was used as part of the theoretical 
foundation for study 2 of this dissertation, presented in Chapter 3. In 
Small et al., all participants viewed a description of impoverished 
individual(s), and viewed an episodic description, a statistical 
description, or a combination of the two. The episodic condition 
provided a photograph of a child, “Rokia,” and gave the following 
description: 
 
Rokia, a 7-year-old girl from Mali, Africa, is desperately poor and 
faces a threat of severe hunger or even starvation. Her life will be 
changed for the better as a result of your financial gift. With your 
support, and the support of other caring sponsors, Save the Children 
will work with Rokia's family and other members of the community to 
help feed her, provide her with education, as well as basic medical care 
and hygiene education (p. 152). 
 
In contrast, the statistical condition did not provide a 
photograph, and gave the following description: 
• Food shortages in Malawi are affecting more than 3 million 
children. 
• In Zambia, severe rainfall deficits have resulted in a 42% drop in 
maize production from 2000. As a result, an estimated 3 million 
Zambians face hunger. 
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• Four million Angolans - one third of the population - have been 
forced to flee their homes. 
• More than 11 million people in Ethiopia need immediate food 
assistance (p. 152). 
In Small et al. (2007) a manipulation was also introduced that 
changed the amount of deliberative thought that participants had 
about their donations. While data suggest that deliberative thought 
suppresses the affective response to an episodic frame, if someone 
wishes to look at the message types alone, it becomes very difficult to 
draw conclusions about the effectiveness of different message 
structures. Differences between the two descriptions include the 
presence or absence of a: 1) photograph, 2) age of victim(s), 3) name of 
victim(s), 4) call for a gift, 5) charity working for those in need, 6) 
identified projects to help those in need, 7) explicit link between a 
donation and aid projects 8) statistics, 9) a narrative vs. a bullet point 
formats, 10) a single subject (Rokia) vs. multiple subjects (different 
countries with individuals in need), and 11) an episodic vs. a thematic 
frame. It is useful to examine messages in a more natural format, as 
was done here, to see how a manipulation such as deliberation may 
alter the response to them; however, without parsing out the 
differences between the messages it becomes impossible to identify 
what variations in the message structure may be driving any message 
effects that are observed. 
Turning a similar critical eye to the studies presented in this 
dissertation, studies one and three have very strong internal validity, 
with minimal manipulations to the message structure. In study 1 
(looking at social identity), the only manipulation was the alteration of 
where climate change would impact in several areas of the text. In 
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study 3 (looking at statistics), the only manipulation was the presence 
or absence of numbers in several places throughout the text. Thus, it 
seems reasonable to conclude that the effects observed in these 
studies are due to the identified message manipulations. Study 2 
(episodic and thematic frames), however, followed the precedent set by 
Iyengar (1990, 1994) for episodic and thematic frames and adopted a 
more naturalistic approach to the framing manipulations, similar to 
the manipulation used in Small et al. (2007). While this approach 
increases the external validity of the study, it limits the ability of the 
researcher to parse out exactly what characteristic of episodic or 
thematic frames may be driving the effect. 
Looking at the message texts (Appendix C and D) of study 2, 
differences include the presence or absence of: 1) an identified, named 
polar bear vs. quantitative data on polar bears in general, 2) 
description of the hunting process of polar bears, 3) two statements 
from experts vs. one statement, 4) a description of the aggregate ice 
loss in the Arctic, 5) a description of why the Arctic is affected more by 
climate change, 6) a description of how much food the polar bear is 
able to eat, 7) a description of how changes in food availability affect 
the weight of polar bears, and 8) a statement of how polar bears may 
die through starvation or drowning due to climate change. As stated 
previously, these differences between episodic and thematic frames 
conform to the types of manipulations found in previous studies in 
this area. However, future research will be required to isolate exactly 
what differences between episodic and thematic frames may be driving 
the changes in policy support for this study. 
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 While it may be tempting to perform a full interaction between 
all possible message differences, the complexity of statistical 
interactions makes it extremely difficult to meaningfully interpret 
anything greater than a 3-way interaction. Thus, when examining 
message structure alone, researchers are generally left with attempting 
to identify key manipulations and investigating them alone, or in 
limited 2 or 3-way interactions with other moderators or 
manipulations of interest. The studies examined here all concern the 
matter of how audiences are likely to respond to different approaches 
of describing the impact of climate change on victims, but are isolated 
to determine the impact of specific message manipulations. The option 
is naturally left for future research to build from these studies and 
begin to examine interactions among them.  
 A natural extension of studies 2 and 3 would be to perform 
additional research that helps disambiguate the conflation exemplified 
by Hoeken and Hustinx (2009) of pairing statistics solely with thematic 
frames and verbal descriptions solely with episodic frames. Looking at 
acceptance and persuasive impact of a general statement, this 
conflation could be parsed out with a 2 (frame: episodic, thematic) x 2 
(statistics: absence, presence) x 2 (numeracy: high, low) interaction. 
This would allow for the investigation of both whether framing or the 
presence or absence of statistics is responsible for the “anecdotal” vs. 
“statistical” effects found in previous studies, and as importantly, 
would introduce the moderator of numeracy to identify if differences 
between conditions only occur for low-numerate individuals. 
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 A second study that naturally extends from those presented in 
this dissertation would combine studies 1 and 2, and perform a 2 
(frame: episodic, thematic) x 2 (social identity: in-group, out-group) x 
political ideology interaction. This would be beneficial, in part, to help 
clarify results recently obtained by Kogut and Ritov (2007).  
As mentioned earlier, previous work by Kogut and Ritov (2005a, 
2005b) found that experimental participants were willing to donate 
more to help an identified individual in need than a group of identified 
individuals in need. Kogut and Ritov (2007) found that when the 
identified victim individual/group manipulation included a moderator 
of whether the victim(s) in need were part of the experimental 
participant’s in-group or out-group, the identified victim effect only 
operated for the in-group victim.  
These results, however, counter the predictions of social identity 
theory (Tajfel, 1974; Tajfel & Turner, 2004). Under social identity 
theory, the description of groups, compared to individuals, makes 
group characteristics, rather than individual characteristics, more 
salient and heightens the impact of the group membership. 
Unfortunately, a direct comparison of the two perspectives is not 
possible from data in Kogut and Ritov (2007), because while Kogut and 
Ritov measure emotional and altruistic response, identification with 
the victim is not measured as a manipulation check. Thus, it is 
possible that Kogut and Ritov were not successful in manipulating 
how much the experimental participants identified with the victims. 
The proposed interaction between episodic and thematic framing, 
social identity, and political ideology, would allow for an investigation 
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into this domain that could directly compare identification, emotional 
response, and altruistic behavior through policy preferences and 
individual behavior change. This, in turn, would help clarify what 
mechanisms may be driving the differences in findings derived from 
the propositions of social identity theory and the identified victim 
effect.  
 The studies presented in this dissertation, then, are best viewed 
as a continuation of previous research, with guideposts towards areas 
that need continued research in the future. Results from future 
studies will continue to help science communicators have a greater 
understanding of how the choices they make in constructing climate 
messages may impact the public response. 
 
Considerations for Application of Research 
The data presented in this dissertation do not offer a 
prescription for how climate change messages ought to be constructed, 
but rather suggest likely impacts of using different climate change 
message structures, as outlined in the introduction to this chapter. 
While the data indicate that climate messages will be most effective if 
they are thematic, use statistics, and focus on victims a message 
receiver identifies with, the question of how a message ought to be 
constructed is inextricably linked to what ought to be done in response 
to climate change. This question is as much an ethical issue (Gardner, 
2006) as it is a practical one (Fankhauser, 2010; IPCC, 2007; 
Mortimore, 2010). Decisions on whether to take action on climate 
change, and if so, what actions to take, need to be made in the context 
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of the interests of the individual and the collective, present and future 
generations, and those who are responsible for and will be affected by 
climate change. The proper response to climate change, such as a 
focus on adaptation, mitigation, or a combination of both, is contested, 
but it is beneficial for science communicators to understand how their 
choices in message construction can influence the response of the 
public. 
Thaler and Sunstein (2003) argue that it is acceptable, if not 
desirable, that communicators adopt a “libertarian paternalistic” 
paradigm when addressing issues surrounding the public good. Under 
this view, libertarian means that one is not coercive, while 
paternalistic means that one is conscious of how messages or decision 
making structures may guide decision making processes. This 
approach is desirable, in part, because individuals often do not make 
decisions that are in their best interest, even by their own account 
(Thaler & Sunstein, 2009). For example, individuals often inordinately 
value present consumption over future consumption, even though 
they are likely to regret it in the future (O'Donoghue & Rabin, 2003). 
A paternalistic approach is also, in almost all communication 
considerations, necessary. An individual may choose not to speak 
about an issue, or to speak about an issue in a specific way, but it is 
impossible to construct a “neutral” message, as the characteristics of 
all messages may only be judged in relation to each other. For 
example, a science communicator may attempt to simply provide “the 
facts” about climate change, but as exemplified in the studies 
presented in this dissertation, facts may be presented in multiple 
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forms that have different effects; there is no baseline form that other 
approaches may be compared to. Thus, a science communicator is left 
with three basic choices: 1) use a message strategy that he or she 
thinks will make the receiver or society best off, 2) randomly choose a 
message strategy, or 3) use a message strategy that he or she thinks 
will make the receiver or society worse off (Thaler & Sunstein, 2003). 
In a competitive resource environment, there may also be the 
additional choice of creating messages that will make select 
individuals or communities better off than others. Confronted with 
these choices, a science communicator may simply choose to adopt a 
normatively prescribed communication approach from their discipline 
– but adopting messages in line with a professional tradition still 
amounts to a choice, and cannot be considered “neutral” or “objective.”  
Under this paradigm, it becomes important that science 
communicators think critically about how their messages may 
resonate with the public, as there is little defense to randomly 
choosing message strategies; the message will still nudge the receiver 
in a direction, but it will be through random chance rather than 
considered deliberation. The framing of messages can then be seen as 
a necessary process, rather than one that is relegated to spin or 
coercion; the relative impact of different message structures is 
unavoidable. Through a considered process, the research presented 
here can then be applied through a rule based choice of cost-benefit 
analysis that hopefully will bring about the most good, and at the 
minimum, makes value choices explicit. 
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The research presented in this dissertation demonstrates the 
impact that subtle changes in message structures can have on the 
response of message receivers. Additional research is necessary to 
continue developing theories addressing how variation in message 
structures may influence policy support and individual behavior 
change related to climate change, amongst other issues, and provide 























Stimulus Materials for Study 2: Episodic Condition 
 
Polar bear struggles for food in the arctic 
  
WASHINGTON — An Alaskan polar bear tracked by government scientists has struggled to cross ice 
flows and find enough food to survive.  
  
The researchers were startled to find that the bear, a female they have nicknamed Frosty, has to swim 
up to 60 miles across open sea to find food. She is forced into the long voyages because the ice floes 
from which she feeds are melting, becoming smaller and drifting farther apart.  
  
Frosty would typically eat one seal every 4 or 5 days. However, as climate change has reduced ice floes, 
she has had to go without food for long stretches of time. As a result, her average weight has dropped 
dramatically over the past year. 
  
“The odds for Frosty’s survival do not look good,” said Steven Amstrup, a U.S. Geological Survey 
(USGS) wildlife research biologist in Anchorage, Alaska, and leader of the polar bear studies. “Without 
immediate action, it is likely that Frosty will either starve or drown in the near future.” 
  
This a call to action, not despair," said Kirstie Siegel of the Arizona-based Center for Biological 
Diversity. "The good news is that there is still time to save Frosty. Our hope lies in a rapid response. It 
is critical to make both deep and immediate carbon dioxide reductions to save Frosty’s habitat and list 
the polar bear as an endangered species. People can help save Frosty by donating to wildlife 
preservation funds, and also by addressing climate change by pushing for comprehensive government 





Stimulus Materials for Studies 2 and 3: Thematic Condition with 
Numbers 
 
Thousands of Polar bears struggle for food in the arctic 
  
WASHINGTON — Climate change is having a dramatic impact on polar bears in the arctic. Most polar 
bears already find it harder to find food, and scientists predict that 12,000 of the 18,000 polar bears in 
the world may be killed off in the near future because of thinning sea ice from global warming in the 
Arctic.  
  
The U.S. Geological Survey projects that polar bears will disappear along the north coasts of Alaska 
and Russia during the next half-century and lose 714,000 square miles (1.85 million square kilometers) 
of the Arctic range they need to live in during summer in the Polar Basin when they hunt and breed. 
  
The Arctic had been predicted to be hit first by global warming, principally because warming at the 
northern pole is enhanced by positive feedback. Snow and ice reflect 80% to 90% of solar radiation 
back into space. But when these white surfaces disappear, more solar radiation is absorbed by the 
underlying land or sea as heat. This heat, in turn, melts more snow and ice. As of September, 2007, sea-
ice extent had fallen to 1.70 million square miles (4.42 million square kilometers)—beating the 
previous record low of 2.05 million square miles (5.32 million square kilometers) set on September 21, 
2005.  
This a call to action, not despair," said Kirstie Siegel of the Arizona-based Center for Biological 
Diversity. "The good news is that there is still time to the polar bear. Our hope lies in a rapid response. 
It is critical to make both deep and immediate carbon dioxide reductions to save habitat for polar bears 
and list the polar bear as an endangered species. People can help save the polar bear by donating to 
wildlife preservation funds, and also by addressing climate change by pushing for comprehensive 
government policies and changing their individual behavior." 
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APPENDIX E 
Stimulus Materials for Study 3: Thematic Condition without Numbers 
Many Polar bears struggle for food in the arctic 
  
WASHINGTON — Climate change is having a dramatic impact on polar bears in the arctic. Most polar 
bears already find it harder to find food, and scientists predict that most polar bears in the world may be 
killed off in the near future because of thinning sea ice from global warming in the Arctic.  
  
The U.S. Geological Survey projects that polar bears will disappear along the north coasts of Alaska 
and Russia during the next half-century and lose much of the Arctic range they need to live in during 
summer in the Polar Basin when they hunt and breed. 
  
The Arctic had been predicted to be hit first by global warming, principally because warming at the 
northern pole is enhanced by positive feedback. Snow and ice reflect 80% to 90% of solar radiation 
back into space. But when these white surfaces disappear, more solar radiation is absorbed by the 
underlying land or sea as heat. This heat, in turn, melts more snow and ice. As of September, 2007, sea-
ice extent had fallen to the lowest level on record—beating the previous record low set on September 
21, 2005.  
This a call to action, not despair," said Kirstie Siegel of the Arizona-based Center for Biological 
Diversity. "The good news is that there is still time to the polar bear. Our hope lies in a rapid response. 
It is critical to make both deep and immediate carbon dioxide reductions to save habitat for polar bears 
and list the polar bear as an endangered species. People can help save the polar bear by donating to 
wildlife preservation funds, and also by addressing climate change by pushing for comprehensive 
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